We propose a formalization of secondary trading of airport slots as a single market. This market is managed through an individual rational and budget balanced combinatorial exchange mechanism. We also quantify the possible advantage of our mechanism with respect to the current practice. To this aim, we solve instances that simulate a portion of European air traffic. We show that en-route sector capacities should be accounted for in the early stage of flight planning. Furthermore, we observe that at the end of the secondary trading the impact of preexisting rights on slots does not statistically affect airlines’ costs.
Secondary trading of airport slots as a combinatorial exchange
PESENTI, Raffaele
2012-01-01
Abstract
We propose a formalization of secondary trading of airport slots as a single market. This market is managed through an individual rational and budget balanced combinatorial exchange mechanism. We also quantify the possible advantage of our mechanism with respect to the current practice. To this aim, we solve instances that simulate a portion of European air traffic. We show that en-route sector capacities should be accounted for in the early stage of flight planning. Furthermore, we observe that at the end of the secondary trading the impact of preexisting rights on slots does not statistically affect airlines’ costs.File in questo prodotto:
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