The goal of this paper is to report on the development of a tool aimed at the automatic detection of attacks against PKCS#11 devices. Instead of modifying or configuring the API, we propose a stateful run-time monitor which is able to track key usage over time, for the identification of operations that might result in the leakage of sensitive keys. We briefly report on the components developed for implementing the monitor and discuss new challenges and open issues.
Run-time analysis of PKCS#11 attacks
CAIAZZA, GIANLUCA;FOCARDI, Riccardo;SQUARCINA, MARCO
2015-01-01
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to report on the development of a tool aimed at the automatic detection of attacks against PKCS#11 devices. Instead of modifying or configuring the API, we propose a stateful run-time monitor which is able to track key usage over time, for the identification of operations that might result in the leakage of sensitive keys. We briefly report on the components developed for implementing the monitor and discuss new challenges and open issues.
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