We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: i) low ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert effort in a task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization's profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion.

Backscratching in Hierarchical Organizations

Valeria, Maggian
;
2018-01-01

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: i) low ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert effort in a task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization's profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
JLEO_MS5376_Final-Submission_REVIEWEROK.pdf

accesso aperto

Descrizione: Articolo principale
Tipologia: Documento in Post-print
Licenza: Accesso gratuito (solo visione)
Dimensione 403.52 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
403.52 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/3696173
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 1
social impact