We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
Optimal Inspection of Rumors in Networks
Nicole Tabasso
2022-01-01
Abstract
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
WP_DSE_merlino_tabasso_19_22.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Documento in Post-print
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione
877.85 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
877.85 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
