

**INTERACT – RESEARCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS’ INTEGRATION AS A THREE-WAY PROCESS - IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION AND COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION AS ACTORS OF INTEGRATION**

***The Migration and Integration  
of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants  
in Italy — Policies and Measures***

**Anna Di Bartolomeo  
Giuseppe Gabrielli  
Salvatore Strozza**

INTERACT Research Report 2015/08



**INTERACT**

**Researching Third Country Nationals' Integration as a Three-way Process -  
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of  
Integration**

**Research Report  
Corridor Report**

**INTERACT RR2015/08**

**The Migration and Integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants  
in Italy – Policies and Measures**

**Anna Di Bartolomeo \***

**Giuseppe Gabrielli \*\***

**Salvatore Strozza \*\***

\* Migration Policy Centre, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European  
University Institute

\*\* Department of Political Sciences, University of Naples "Federico II"

This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Requests should be addressed to [mpc@eui.eu](mailto:mpc@eui.eu)

If cited or quoted, reference should be made as follows:

Anna Di Bartolomeo, Giuseppe Gabrielli, Salvatore Strozza, The Migration and Integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in Italy: Policies and Measures, INTERACT RR 2015/08, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2015.

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and should not be considered as representative of the official position of the European Commission or of the European University Institute.

© 2015, European University Institute

ISBN: 978-92-9084-280-4

DOI: 10.2870/870237

Catalogue Number: QM-04-15-274-EN-N

European University Institute  
Badia Fiesolana  
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)  
Italy

<http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/>

<http://interact-project.eu/publications/>

<http://cadmus.eui.eu>

## **INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals' Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration**

In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe.

*For more information:*

INTERACT

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI)

Villa Malafasca

Via Boccaccio 151

50133 Florence

Italy

Tel: +39 055 46 85 817/892

Fax: + 39 055 46 85 755

Email: [mpc@eui.eu](mailto:mpc@eui.eu)

**Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies**

<http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/>

## **Abstract**

The present report looks at the integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy. Beyond being quantitatively important in the Italian context, these two groups differ largely in terms of demographic characteristics, migration patterns and insertion modalities but also with respect to emigration and diaspora policies. Two core aspects of integration are emphasized in this report. First, integration processes are evaluated from a multi-dimensional perspective. Second, the role played by origin (and destination) country determinants in facilitating or constraining integration is investigated. Origin determinants include the ties between migrants and their country of origin, country-fixed characteristics, diaspora and emigration policies at origin and the engagement and role of non-state organisations. To this aim, three sets of data have been employed, making this report largely multi-disciplinary: an in-depth analytical description of the legal and political frameworks at origin and destination, a quantitative analysis and an explorative qualitative survey. This report finds evidence that integration levels, determinants and, specifically, the role of origin factors vary largely across dimensions. In the labour market, both Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy show high levels of integration. These extremely positive performances seem due more to destination than origin factors – namely Italy’s labour market specificities and migration history. Conversely, origin determinants presumably have a lower impact. In addition, the role played by NGOs appears relevant in helping migrants find employment – not good employment or well-remunerated employment but just employment. In the education dimension, things differ. At an international level, Ukrainians living in Italy show good levels of integration once controlled for natives’ performance. Origin determinants – in terms of conditions at home – thus seem to prevail here. Not surprisingly, the degree of integration in the “access to citizenship” dimension is connected to the degree of openness/restrictiveness of host citizenship laws and, accordingly, to the length of presence in the country. Our results confirm that Italy is still one of the countries where getting citizenship is one of the main constraints for migrants in both recent communities (Ukrainians) and well-established ones (Moroccans). Finally, cultural integration is a main obstacle to Moroccan integration, while Ukrainians are also found to be in a difficult position with respect to social and political integration. In terms of ties between migrants and their country of origin, a micro-level analysis confirms a very clear pattern: the lower the (cultural, economic, political, social) ties, the higher the level of integration. This applies – to a different extent – to all dimensions and types of ties.

**Key words:** Integration of migrants, Italy, Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants, role of origin determinants, composite indicators

## Table of contents

1. Introduction .....	7
2. Immigration trends and characteristics of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in Italy .....	8
2.1 Brief considerations on data sources and stock figures.....	8
2.2 Trends and characteristics of inflows of Moroccan and Ukrainian immigrants .....	9
2.3 Demographic and spatial characteristics of Moroccan and Ukrainian populations .....	12
3. Institutional and policy framework .....	15
3.1 An overview of Italian integration policies.....	15
3.2 Institutional and policy framework of emigration/diaspora policies of Morocco and Ukraine....	19
4. Integration trends of Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants in Italy .....	25
4.1 Complementary findings from the ISMU sample survey .....	28
5. The role of organisations supporting migrants’ integration in Italy: results of the INTERACT qualitative survey .....	33
6. Conclusions on integration levels and the role of <i>origin determinants</i> .....	36
References .....	38





## 1. Introduction

The present report looks at the integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy. According to INTERACT objectives, two core aspects of integration are emphasized in the report. First, integration processes are evaluated from a multi-dimensional perspective. Second, the roles played by origin (and destination) country determinants in facilitating or constraining integration are investigated. Origin determinants include the ties between migrants and their country of origin, the characteristics of migrants which originate in specific countries, diaspora and emigration policies at origin and the engagement and role of non-state organisations.

In this sense, Italy's policy and legislative integration assets seem a very interesting case. The Committee for Integration Policies of Immigrants, established with the Turco-Napolitano Law (Law n. 40/1998) and the following Legislative Decree (*Decreto legislativo* 286/1998) define the following *keystones* of the integration process: a) the integrity of the individuals and communities involved in the migration process and b) the positive interaction and peaceful co-existence among all communities, including the natives' (Zincone 2000). According to this paradigm, the Committee defined four different aspects that need to be taken into account for the construction of an adequate system of measurement of the process of integration of migrants: a) the socio-demographic and origin characteristics of immigrants to consider their social and human capital; b) the links of immigrants with the origin and destination countries to evaluate the integration process; c) the effective and full insertion into school and the workplace, as key issues for social mobility; d) the active participation and condition of life in society to show positive involvement in the host context (Golini *et al.* 2001). These assets already include the two core aspects of integration we are interested in, namely multi-dimensionality and the potential role played by origin determinants.

The focus is on Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants because these two groups are quantitatively important in the Italian case and are very different in terms of demographic characteristics, migration patterns and insertion modalities as well as the emigration and diaspora policies in their home countries. This diversity allows us to better emphasize origin country factors.

Three sets of data have been employed, making this report largely multi-disciplinary: an in-depth analytical description of the legal and political frameworks, a quantitative analysis and an explorative qualitative survey.

The analysis of the legal and political frameworks is provided at both destination (Italy) and origin (Morocco and Ukraine). While integration policies of destination countries are discussed, both the diaspora and emigration policies at origin are also tackled.<sup>1</sup> Data include policy documents, legal acts, etc. Such analyses are based on INTERACT Country Reports: Caneva 2014 (Italy), Ivashchenko 2014 (Ukraine), and Ait Madani 2014 (Morocco).

The quantitative analysis reports the results of the INTERACT Quantitative Study (Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015), which compares the level of integration of a 'number of migrant communities living in selected EU states' (the so-called 'migrant corridors') in three dimensions: labour market, education and access to citizenship. Additional quantitative findings from the ISMU Sample Survey (Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009) are reported, as a complement to the previous analysis.

---

<sup>1</sup> According to the INTERACT conceptual framework, emigration policies are "all policies that regulate (either facilitate or limit) outward migration, mobility across countries and possible return", while diaspora policies are "the policies that engage emigrants and members of diaspora communities (both organised communities and individuals) with the countries of origin, building the sense of belonging and strengthening ties" (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014).

The third set of data is based on the results of the INTERACT Qualitative Survey. This explorative survey was conducted between December 2013 and September 2014 and targeted civil society organisations working with migrants in (at least) one of the following dimensions: labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues or housing. Their role in supporting migrants' integration and their opinions on the impact of origin determinants are both focused upon.

The report is structured as follows. Section 2 presents trends and main characteristics of Moroccan and Ukrainian migration to Italy. In Section 3, Italian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migration policies are presented and potential convergences and clashes between origin and destination assets are discussed. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of the quantitative and qualitative section, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes the report, summing up findings and proposing a coherent framework of integration levels and determinants with a special focus on origin factors.

## 2. Immigration trends and characteristics of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in Italy

### 2.1 Brief considerations on data sources and stock figures

According to the 2001 Census, Moroccan and Ukrainian residents respectively equalled 180,000 and less than 9,000 (or 13.5% and 0.6% of the total foreign resident population) (Table 1, columns 4 and 7). Table 1 also reports numbers retrieved from residence permit statistics (Table 1, columns 2-3, 5-6). They differ from census data mainly due to two sets of reasons. First, these numbers include migrants who hold a valid residence permit but do not reside in the country (regular stayers); as such, they are not included in the resident population counted by the Census. Second, in 2001 they did not include minor children.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of 2001, the number of Moroccans holding a valid residence permit is markedly lower than that of Moroccans recorded by the Census (160,000 vs. 180,000). This data discrepancy suggests that, as for the Moroccan case, stayers who were minors were already a very important component of resident permit holders at the beginning of 2000s. On the contrary, the number of Ukrainians holding a valid residence permit was higher (11,000) than the statistic recorded by census data (9,000). Thus in the Ukrainian case, people who had a residence permit but did not reside in Italy outnumbered minors accompanying their parents (or relatives) (i.e. those not counted by residence permits). This pattern is still valid in more recent years.

**Table 1. Stock of Moroccans and Ukrainians living in Italy according to different data sources. Italy, 2001, 2011-2012 (values in thousands)**

Year	Moroccans			Ukrainians		
	Adults (18+) with a RP (*)	Total regular stayers	Total residents	Adults with a RP	Total regular stayers	Total residents
2001	157.7	...	180.1	11.0	...	8.6
2011	352.6	506.4	407.1	203.4	223.8	178.5
2012	355.4	513.4	412.7	203.9	224.6	192.3

Notes: (\*) RP = residence permit; Total regular stayers = Adults (18+) with a RP plus children (aged 0-17) with a parent with a RP.

Source: Data on RPs are collected by Ministry of Interior, and revised and provided by ISTAT; data on residents are collected by ISTAT from the 2001 and 2011 Population Censuses or Population Registers (2012).

<sup>2</sup> Only minor children who are entitled to residence permits, as unaccompanied minors, were included.

At the beginning of the 2000s, Moroccans and Ukrainians thus differed significantly in terms of numbers and profiles as a result of their different migration histories. Moroccan migration to Italy started first in the mid-1980s. In 1991 (according to census data) there were already almost 40,000 Moroccans residing in Italy. From the 1990s until the mid-2000s, they represented the major migrant group (Paterno *et al.* 2006). Ukrainian migration to Italy, on the other hand, started to boom only in the following decade, at the end of 1990s.

Most recent data allows one to appreciate such evolving dynamics. In the inter-census period (2001-2011), Moroccans more than doubled, reaching a peak of 400,000 persons. Their number thus grew by 230,000 individuals due to a positive balance both in migration and natural terms (births minus deaths). A significant growth was also observed among Ukrainians. According to the 2011 Census, their number equalled almost 180,000 people. Unlike in the Moroccan case, this growth is largely due to positive net migration dynamics.

## 2.2 Trends and characteristics of inflows of Moroccan and Ukrainian immigrants

In the last decade, Italy witnessed the most significant inflow of foreigners ever registered. The 2001-2011 inter-census migration balance equalled +2.6 million persons, which was almost entirely attributable to foreign population movements (+2.5 million). The annual net immigration rate stood at 4.5%, i.e. higher than those registered by European ‘traditional’ immigration countries in the 1950s and 1960s (Strozza 2010). Moroccans and Ukrainians represented an important portion of such impressive growth, as confirmed by the analysis of migration flows.

Migration flows are analysed here through micro-data on the registrations and de-registrations of residence from/to countries abroad in municipal population registers<sup>3</sup> (Table 2). In the 11-year period (2002-2012), 278,000 Moroccans and 226,000 Ukrainians registered from abroad (equal to an annual average of 25,000 and 21,000, respectively). Higher peaks are observed for both migrant groups in concomitance with regularizations, namely in 2003-2004 and 2008-2010. In fact, as soon as migrants are regularized they immediately obtain a residence permit in order to subsequently register as residents. This confirms that the data retrieved by population registers often do not coincide with the period of actual entry.

---

<sup>3</sup> This should be noted as this dataset has the typical disadvantages of all administrative sources. Inflows and outflows are often registered with delays with respect to the actual entry in the country. Outflows also tend to be underestimated because a portion of emigrants simply do not declare their departures abroad (Bonifazi and Strozza 2006). In addition, a small part of compiled modules in Italian municipalities is not transmitted to Istat while another small part is not processed because it lacks basic required information. This underestimation has, however, tended to diminish in recent years.

**Table 2. Immigration from abroad of foreigners, according to micro-data of registrations from Population Registers. Total foreigners, Moroccan and Ukrainian citizens. Italy, 2002-2012 (values in thousands and percentages)**

Years	Micro-data (in thousands)			% of total foreign immigrants	
	Total	Morocco	Ukraine	Morocco	Ukraine
2002	168.7	14.6	3.8	8.7	2.3
2003	392.8	32.4	41.3	8.2	10.5
2004	373.1	31.0	33.5	8.3	9.0
2005	267.6	21.4	15.1	8.0	5.7
2006	242.0	19.5	14.1	8.0	5.8
2007	490.4	19.7	14.8	4.0	3.0
2008	462.3	35.4	22.3	7.7	4.8
2009	392.5	30.7	21.9	7.8	5.6
2010	419.6	29.6	29.9	7.1	7.1
2011	354.3	23.9	17.9	6.7	5.0
2012	321.3	19.6	11.5	6.1	3.6

Source: our calculations based on ISTAT data from Municipal Population Registers.

After 2010, international migration inflows started to diminish instead. This is also confirmed when we look at migration inflows as *proxied* by annual first Residence Permits (RPs) (Table 3).

**Table 3. Annual inflows (first RPs) of non-EU citizens of Morocco and Ukraine by sex and age group. Italy, 2007-2012 (values in thousands and percentages)**


Year	Absolute values (in thousands)	% of total annual inflow	% of women
<b>Morocco</b>			
2007	32.2	12.0	42.9
2008	32.9	11.5	47.6
2009	37.8	9.6	41.1
2010	65.0	10.9	39.3
2011	31.0	8.6	42.4
2012	21.6	8.2	49.7
<b>Ukraine</b>			
2007	24.0	9.0	79.0
2008	22.0	7.7	78.6
2009	39.4	10.0	83.6
2010	48.7	8.1	81.2
2011	15.7	4.3	67.1
2012	8.7	3.3	67.0

Source: our calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised and provided by ISTAT.

The post-2010 drop seems linked to the on-going economic recession, which not only impacted the number of migrants arriving but also – and particularly – impacted their composition.

Data on first residence permits by reason to migrate (Figure 1) are revealing in this sense. After 2010, in concomitance with the exacerbation of the global economic crisis, family reunification arrivals gradually acquired more and more importance for both groups compared to labour migration arrivals (Figure 1). In 2011, among Moroccans, family reunified migrants represented 54% of total flows, peaking at 66% in 2012. An even more marked increase is observed among Ukrainians. In the period 2007-2010, permits issued for work reasons comprised a very large majority of all first residence permits (more than 80%), decreasing to 53% in 2011 and dropping to 30% in 2012. In the latter year, the majority of the (few) new permits were indeed granted for family reasons (56%).


**Figure 1. Annual inflows (first RPs) of non-EU citizens of Morocco and Ukraine by reason of arrival. Italy, 2007-2012 (values in percentages)**



Source: our calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised and provided by ISTAT.

As a result of the changes in the type of migration inflows, the demographic profile of recent migrants differs substantially compared to that of pre-2010 inflows (Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Annual inflows (first RPs) of non-EU citizens of Morocco and Ukraine by sex and age group. Italy, 2007-2012 (values in percentages)**



Source: our calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised and provided by ISTAT.

Before 2010, demographic differences between Moroccan and Ukrainian arrival migrants were striking. In 2009 and 2010, Moroccans were much more likely to be men (60%) and young (3 out of 4 were aged 18-44). Minors accounted for 13% of arrivals, while old people aged 60 and older comprised around 5%. The large majority of Ukrainians was in contrast composed of women (more than 80%), while an important share (37-39%) was aged 45-59. Such differences narrowed after 2010. In 2011 and 2012, a less unbalanced gender profile is indeed observed for both groups. In 2012, Moroccan women represented almost 50% of arrivals, while Ukrainian women still comprised the majority (65%) but at a less pronounced level than in previous years. For both groups, in 2012, minors reached their highest percentage of all six years.


### 2.3 Demographic and spatial characteristics of Moroccan and Ukrainian populations

Age pyramids are a synthetic and analytic way to get an immediate understanding of demographic differences between the two migrant groups (Figure 3). The Moroccan pyramid is large at the bottom (reflecting both family reunifications and births in Italy) and diminishes progressively until 15-19 years of age and then increases again until the modal age of 30-34 for women and 35-39 for men. There is an evident imbalance in terms of gender among the working age population, with a large prevalence of men.

The Ukrainian age pyramid is a case in point. The very large prevalence of women is particularly evident starting from 35 years of age and signals the significant presence of middle aged women (with a modal age of 50-54 years of age). The bottom of the pyramid is instead very thin due to the very scarce presence of children, at least those aged less than 20. Indeed, the gender balance in the 20-29 age group also seems to signalling a large number of children arriving with their parents or following their aged mothers.

While the mean age of regular Moroccans does not reach 30 years of age without significant differences by sex, among Ukrainians it is higher than 42 with large differences between men (31.5) and women (higher than 45) (Table 4). Such a gap is due to the scarce weight of Ukrainian underage women (less than 6% vs. 24% among men).

**Figure 3. Population pyramids for Moroccans and Ukrainians who have a residence permit or are inserted into a parent's. Italy, 31 December 2012. Percentage sex and age distribution**



Source: our calculations based on data from the Ministry of Interior revised and provided by ISTAT.

Migrants holding a valid residence permit include both permanent and temporary stayers, depending on the type of permit. Around two out of three regular Moroccan migrants have a permanent residence permit vs. around one out of two Ukrainians (Table 4).

Migrants with permanent residence permits have specific characteristics that indicate a more stable presence on the territory together with a high presence of family members. For instance, among all third-country nationals, the percentage of minors is almost 30% for permanent residents vs. only 18% for temporary stayers. The share of people aged 35-54 (potential parents) is close to 40% for permanent permit holders while for temporary permit holders, the share of people aged 18-34 prevails (43%). Both the dependency ratio and child-woman ratio are higher among permanent permit holders as well, which obviously have a more balanced gender structure.

Such differential characteristics between temporary and permanent permit holders are clearly reflected in the Moroccan group. Also the fact that women with permanent permits have a lower mean age than those with temporary permits (27 versus 31 years of age) is probably in line with the

hypothesis that they often are daughters and wives of first migrants, usually men. The values of the dependency and child-woman ratios of Moroccans are higher than those recorded for all other migrant groups. Also, these ratios are especially high among those holding a permanent RP. The regular Moroccan presence thus appears family oriented and stable.

**Table 4. Demographic characteristics of Moroccans, Ukrainians and other third-country nationals who have a residence permit (RP) or are inserted into a parent's, by type of permit. Italy, 31 December 2012**

Values and Indices	Morocco			Ukraine			Other Third Countries		
	Tempo- rary RP	Perma- nent RP	Total	Tempo- rary RP	Perma- nent RP	Total	Tempo- rary RP	Perma- nent RP	Total
No. of RPs	184,513	328,861	513,374	114,000	110,588	224,588	1,420,061	1,606,213	3,026,274
% by type of RP	35.9	64.1	100.0	50.8	49.2	100.0	46.9	53.1	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>									
% female	43.4	44.1	43.9	78.0	81.7	79.8	47.6	48.4	48.0
Mean age	31.4	28.8	29.7	40.8	44.2	42.4	31.6	31.3	31.5
% under 18	20.8	36.4	30.8	9.6	8.8	9.2	17.8	29.7	24.1
% 18-34	39.8	21.7	28.2	25.4	14.1	19.9	43.3	22.9	32.4
% 35-54	30.9	34.2	33.0	44.7	50.2	47.4	31.8	39.0	35.6
% 55 and over	8.6	7.7	8.0	20.3	26.8	23.5	7.1	8.5	7.8
Dependency ratio <sup>(a)</sup>	29.4	55.3	44.9	11.3	11.1	11.2	21.2	39.8	30.4
Child-woman ratio <sup>(b)</sup>	35.8	50.9	45.0	6.2	5.0	5.6	19.7	27.7	23.6
<b>MALE</b>									
Mean age	31.3	30.3	30.7	30.8	32.5	31.5	30.6	31.3	31.0
% under 18	19.2	34.1	28.7	22.2	24.3	23.2	17.9	30.3	24.4
% 18-34	40.7	18.0	26.2	39.7	26.6	33.8	46.2	20.9	32.9
% 35-54	34.3	39.5	37.7	31.2	39.9	35.1	30.7	41.2	36.2
% 55 and over	5.8	8.3	7.4	7.0	9.1	7.9	5.2	7.6	6.5
<b>FEMALE</b>									
Mean age	31.4	26.9	28.5	43.6	46.8	45.2	32.7	31.4	32.0
% under 18	22.9	39.2	33.4	6.1	5.4	5.7	17.7	29.1	23.8
% 18-34	38.6	26.4	30.7	21.4	11.3	16.3	40.0	25.0	32.0
% 35-54	26.3	27.5	27.1	48.5	52.5	50.6	33.0	36.6	34.9
% 55 and over	12.1	6.9	8.8	24.0	30.8	27.4	9.3	9.3	9.3

Notes: (a) Population under 15 and over 65 years old per 100 people 15-64 years old. (b) Children under 5 years old per 100 women 15-49 years old.

Source: our calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised and provided by ISTAT.

Among Ukrainians, the owners of permanent permits are people who have a longer presence in the country than those with a temporary permit. However, it cannot be said whether or not they have more stable roots in the country. Indeed, they not only show a more unbalanced gender composition but also the share of minors and of people aged 18-34 is less significant compared to those who hold temporary permits. Without any doubt, the differences between Ukrainians and Moroccans do not depend on their different compositions by type of permit but rather on the different migration models and strategies, as well as the different length of stay of the two diasporas in Italy. Moroccan immigration today is linked to family reunification dynamics and births by Moroccan parents in Italy. Immigration from Ukraine has rather a more individual trait. First-migrants are mainly composed of middle-aged women, married or with

previous marriage experiences for whom – it can be hypothesized – *de facto* family reunifications will mostly involve adult children arriving to complete studies and/or look for a job.

On the basis of residence permit data, it is possible to observe the spatial distribution of the two migrant groups in Italian territory at a provincial level (NUTS 3), i.e. in 103 provinces (Table 5). Again, large differences are observed. Moroccans live mainly in the North of Italy (73%) especially in the provinces of Turin (6.4%), Milan (6.0%), Bergamo (4.9%), Brescia and, Modena (4.2%). Ukrainians are much more widespread across Italy. In both the Centre and the South of Italy, their presence is higher than that of Moroccans. They are mainly concentrated in the Campania region (more than 15%), particularly in the provinces of Naples (10.2%) and Salerno (3.5%). A significant presence is also found in the provinces of Milan (9.4%) and Rome (8.9%).

**Table 5. Geographic distribution, main provinces of presence and indices of geographic dissimilarity of Moroccans, Ukrainians and other Third-Country foreigners (TCs) holding residence permits (including minors registered within parents' permits). Italy, 31 December 2012**

Indices of geographical distribution	Morocco	Ukraine	other Third Countries
<b>% by geographic division</b>			
North-West	41.7	27.7	36.7
North-East	31.3	25.2	27.9
Centre	14.1	20.8	24.8
South	9.3	24.6	7.4
Islands	3.5	1.7	3.1
<b>% in metropolitan provinces<sup>(a)</sup></b>	23.6	37.4	38.1
<b>Minimum number of provinces needed to achieve</b>			
25% of the total population	5	3	3
50% of the total population	15	12	13
75% of the total population	37	32	33
<b>Top 5 provinces by number of residents</b>			
1st province (% of residents)	Turin (6.4)	Naples (10.2)	Milan (12.7)
2nd province (% of residents)	Milan (6.0)	Milan (9.4)	Rome (9.4)
3rd province (% of residents)	Bergamo (4.9)	Rome (8.9)	Brescia (4.4)
4th province (% of residents)	Brescia (4.4)	Salerno (3.5)	Florence (3.1)
5th province (% of residents)	Modena (4.2)	Brescia (3.4)	Bergamo (3.0)
<b>Index of dissimilarity (%) with other TCNs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	27.0	27.6	
<b>Index of dissimilarity (%) with Italians<sup>(b)</sup></b>	32.0	28.2	27.2

Notes: (a) The twelve metropolitan provinces are: those related to the nine areas defined by Law 142 (i.e. the provinces of Turin, Genoa, Milan, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples and Bari) plus three islands provinces (Palermo, Catania and Cagliari). (b) The relative index of dissimilarity (IRD) is calculated as half the sum of the absolute differences between two distributions for the province. The geographical distribution of the considered foreign community is compared with that of the rest of third-country foreigners and that of the Italian residents.

Source: our calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised and provided by ISTAT.

The statistical data presented here allow us to track average profiles clearly distinguished between immigrants from Morocco and Ukraine.

Dating back more than thirty years, Moroccan immigration continues to be quantitatively important. Initially characterised by single young males, since the mid-1990s migrants have been



predominately female, arriving through family reunification channels and creating a gender structure that at present is almost rebalanced. The stabilisation of Moroccan migration to Italy is confirmed by a high share of minors and an increased importance of families in a community that still continues to have quite high fertility levels, much higher than those of the Italian population. Over time, the Moroccan territorial concentration has increased in the North of Italy, where the range of employment opportunities is broader, thus increasing the chances of stabilization and integration for these migrants.

In contrast, Ukrainian migration started only in the late 1990s. It became quantitatively significant following the 2002 regularization, after which it continued to grow. Ukrainian migrants are composed mainly of women aged 40 and older, who often left their husbands and children behind in order to provide them with financial support from abroad. For instance, a significant share of Ukrainian immigrants is comprised of separated and divorced women who need to provide support to their children at home. Recently there has been a slight shift toward more permanent migration for Ukrainian women. This has happened in part because mixed marriages are becoming increasingly frequent, and in part because minors are reunifying with their mothers in Italy in order to complete their studies or look for a job. The economic crisis has slowed down economic migration from Ukraine, resulting in an increasing importance of children's reunification channels.

The two groups show significant differences not only in terms of migratory trends (reasons and strategies), demographic characteristics and territorial distribution in Italy, but also with respect to their insertion in the Italian labour market. While Moroccans are inserted across a wide range of occupations (including self-employment), Ukrainians are strongly characterized by an impressive concentration of elderly-care workers in private household services. In this report, these differences and their relationships to integration outcomes will be analysed in detail.

### **3. Institutional and policy framework**

#### **3.1 An overview of Italian integration policies**

##### *3.1.1 The historical evolution*

In Italy, the integration of immigrants was long perceived as a *de facto* process taking place within the labour market and depending upon economic performance. Only in 1998 did the Turco-Napolitano Law (40/1998) recognise it as a topic *per se*, although in the absence of public debate (Caponio 2013). Specifically, Title V included a range of measures to be adopted on the labour market, health, education, housing and civic participation. To a large extent, these measures were designed by looking at local practices, namely multi-cultural courses and cultural mediation at school, Italian language courses for adults, housing benefits, etc. To facilitate their implementation, Law no. 40/1998 introduced the National Fund for Migration Policies – to be allocated between Italian regions and local governments – which was later replaced by the 2006 Fund for the Social Inclusion of Immigrants. The law stated that the government – after consulting with local institutions – should enact a three-year Strategic Plan on both admission and integration policies.

The implementation of this law was challenging, however, mostly due to the lack of national coordination over local institutions and the disproportionate role put on economic issues while social and cultural policies instead remained marginal (Caponio and Zincone 2011). Later, the 2002 Bossi-Fini Law (189/2002) introduced new rules on admission quotas but left the normative and organisational framework of the integration policies unchanged.

The shift towards a re-conceptualization of integration in other than economic terms is a recent process which started only in the mid-2000s. Following the September 11th attacks in 2001 and other dramatic events – including the homicide of Theo Van Gogh (2004) and the terrorist attacks of Madrid

(2004) and London (2005) – integration and social cohesion become more and more publicly debated. The link between migration and social security was prevailing. Like in many other European countries, Italian politics addressed public concerns by adopting an identitarian (or neo-assimilationist) approach (Joppke 2007; Zincone 2011), that resulted in the low recognition of other cultural identities together with a full adhesion to host societies' values (Caponio 2013). This new approach was pursued by the Berlusconi IV government (May 2008-November 2011) with the introduction of the “Accordo di integrazione” (in force by March 2012) and the “Piano per l'integrazione nella sicurezza”, the latter included in the “Pacchetto sicurezza” Law (Law 94/2009). These legislative acts are still in force today.

### *3.1.2 How integration is managed today: policy tools and areas of intervention*

At the time of writing, the “Accordo di integrazione” and the “Piano per l'integrazione nella sicurezza” are the core documents managing the integration of immigrants in Italy. In addition, bilateral agreements with origin countries have long characterized Italian immigration policies in the sphere of labour migration and economic integration. Accordingly, Law no. 94/2009 inaugurated a new set of agreements.

#### *“Accordo di integrazione”*

In keeping with the renewed Italian neo-assimilationist approach, when issued a residence permit, immigrants have to sign the “Accordo di integrazione”, according to which they commit themselves to achieving the following “integration goals” (within two years): a) learning Italian (level A2); b) obtaining a sufficient knowledge of the Italian Constitution and institutions; c) acquiring a deep knowledge of Italian civic values together with the functioning of health, educational and social services systems, the labour market and taxes; d) obliging children to attend school until 16 years of age (i.e. 10 years of schooling). The agreement is articulated into credits: initially, immigrants are given 16 credits but are required to reach 30 credits in two years. They can be obtained through participation in certified Italian language courses, Italian history and civic courses, professional and vocational training, etc. These courses are not compulsory, except for one 5-10 hour session to be attended in the first three months. It aims at improving immigrants' knowledge about points c) and d), described above. As regards language courses (point a), although they are not compulsory, immigrants must pass an Italian language exam (level A2). Many non-profit organisations and Italian institutions offer language courses free of charge. Credits can also be lost if an immigrant does not: a) pass the language test; b) attend the 5-10 hour compulsory session and/or c) respect Italian laws. In extreme cases they lose all credits, the residence permit is revoked and expulsion enforced.

#### *“Piano per l'integrazione nella sicurezza”*

The “Piano per l'integrazione nella sicurezza” includes five priority areas where integration policies need to be implemented: a) the knowledge of Italian language, values and civic culture should be promoted both at school (for young people) and out of school (for adults) through the implementation of language and training courses. Women are in this case considered a priority group; b) within the labour market dimension, the necessity of fighting against informal recruiting and employment is envisaged, supporting immigrants' entrepreneurship and developing pre-departure trainings; c) housing policies should both facilitate immigrants' search for a house and avoid ethnic segregation enclaves; d) access to social and health services needs to be promoted by means of public advertising, multi-cultural mediation, training programs for health and social workers and cooperation between national and local institutions; e) finally, a focus needs to be put on immigrants' children, for whom the right to be educated needs be guaranteed. The document establishes an *ad hoc* Committee for Foreign Minors to promote integration policies.

*Bilateral agreements and pre-departure trainings*

Bilateral agreements have long characterized the Italian approach to the labour market and to economic migration (Ambrosetti and Paparusso 2012-13). The “Pacchetto sicurezza” emphasized a renewed phase of bilateral agreements to support supply/demand matching at origin and destination. To this end, it includes the following tools: a) supporting the exchange of information; b) promoting training courses and educational cooperation programmes; c) assigning preferential quotas to those who attend pre-departure courses. The latter can be considered the main innovative instrument envisaged here. For the first time, these pre-departure courses have been conceived not only as vocational courses but also as training on the Italian language, civic values, the functioning of the educational system, security at work, etc. Also the way the courses are organized is quite innovative. The majority are meant to be organized and managed by private intermediation agencies that recruit workers at origin, in accordance with Italian labour market needs.

Such a renewed approach thus gives major emphasis to the external dimension of migration being based on a three-win solution: origin countries may benefit from preferential quotas while implicitly guaranteeing Italian authorities more rigid control of irregular outward migration out-flows (Caponio 2013). In the end, immigrants are supported at both the origin and destination points.

*3.1.3 Integration policy implementation and the role of local and non-state actors*

Despite the renewed role of public national policies in the framework of integration and the recent shift towards individuating a major link between admission and integration, the overall implementation of integration policies is still largely challenged by two sets of reasons: a) the extraordinary role assumed by local institutions and, consequently, the existence of strong regional disparities and b) budgetary constraints.

With respect to the former, integration policies are today largely implemented and designed at the local level, namely by local institutions (regions, provinces and municipalities) and NGOs. This has two main consequences. On the one hand, integration measures have provided users with a high degree of heterogeneity. Striking differences are observed between opportunities and incentives in the North and the South of Italy, large and small cities, urban and rural zones. On the other hand, the engagement of such actors has resulted in many more *ad hoc* interventions in accordance with local needs and priorities. In so doing, local actors have been able to address specific territorial needs and counterbalance the shortcomings of national policies. Some notable tools adopted at a local level are a) information points; b) cultural mediation activities and linguistic courses; c) local financing for housing. Information points are widespread within Italian Municipalities. They help migrants with the navigation of health and school services, bureaucratic procedures for renewing residence permits and any other kinds of needs. Cultural mediation has long been an efficient tool aimed at improving the understanding and collaboration between migrants and public institutions (schools, hospitals, police, etc.). Unlike in other EU countries (e.g. France and Spain), cultural mediators are not public servants. In addition, linguistic courses for adults are largely diffused and managed by local NGOs and provincial institutions (*Centri provinciali d'istruzione degli adulti*). Local housing policies have also been gradually oriented to provide migrants with specific services in order to meet the growing demand for housing. Such services have mainly been directed towards the creation and development of agencies for mediating between Italian owners – who are often reluctant to rent houses to foreigners – and migrants. Often, these agencies provide guarantees for rent payments, intervene in case of conflicts and even develop construction projects or form buyers' cooperatives (OECD 2014).

Budgetary constraints are another major issue for Italian integration policies. Today, public funds include: a) financial resources managed by the Directorate-General for Immigration and Integration Policies within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies; b) European funds (namely the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which has now been replaced by the European Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration). As with the former, Law no. 40/1998 introduced the

National Fund for Migration Policies, to be allocated (80%) between Italian regions and local governments. In 2000, this Fund was merged with the broader Fund for Social Policies. Until 2003, the amount of money to be designated to integration policies was defined at a state level. In 2003, the Budget Law (46/2003) amended any budgetary constraints: it was up to regional entities to determine the amount of money to be devolved to integration measures. From its maximum amount in 2001 (56.4 million), this Fund has been drastically reduced over time (Table 6, column 2). In 2007, the Fund for Social Inclusion was created but was then suppressed only one year later.

**Table 6. Public funding to integration policies, 2005-2013 (values in thousands of euros)**

Year	National Fund for Migration Policies	European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals	
		EU funds	Italian funds
2005	4,429	-	-
2006	16,477	-	-
2007	5,347	6,315	2,452
2008	6,450	8,591	3,858
2009	24,357	15,062	6,557
2010	28,732	20,445	8,945
2011	7,560	27,137	11,486
2012	6,250	34,174	14,324
2013	-	36,957	22,657

Source: Lunaria 2014.

In recent years, the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals has been the major resource for financing Italian integration policies (Table 6, columns 3-4). In the period 2007-2013, this Fund targeted a wide range of objectives in all spheres of life (economic, religious, social, political, linguistic.). It co-finances from 50% to 75% of national integration projects. Funds were given directly to national institutions if projects were designed at a state level, or through tenders for local projects. Major fields of intervention were linguistic and civic education projects, youth initiatives, and cultural mediation. For the period 2014-2020, the Fund has been replaced by the European Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration.

To summarize, Italian integration policies are still largely jeopardized by a high degree of heterogeneity at a territorial level; the nature of policy implementation is contingent upon the sensitiveness and efficiency of local actors. The lack of coordination at the national level is frequently cited as a major issue (Lunaria 2014; OECD 2014) in today's context where the EU is the major financial actor funding the development of integration policies in the country.

#### *3.1.4 Integration policies towards Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants*

Though integration policy tools do not discriminate by origin – so that all migrant groups are treated the same – there are groups that are considered as ‘most vulnerable’, namely women and children. Accordingly, they are the target of specific integration measures.<sup>4</sup>

As a matter of fact, there are some migrants groups which have implicitly become the target of integration interventions, especially at a sub-national level. In this sense, Ukrainian migrants are – potentially – a privileged group in integration terms, given that women represent the large majority and that they are especially prevalent in the work force. At a state level, the “Piano per l’integrazione

<sup>4</sup> Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali e Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca 2010: 10.

nella sicurezza” explicitly calls for women migrants to be *integration agents*, stating that “the inclusion of foreign women mirrors the degree of integration reached by a society”.<sup>5</sup> However, it fails to recognize the growing role assumed by women migrants in the Italian labour market, especially in the care-giving sector, where the majority of Ukrainian women are inserted. Indeed, in the “Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza”, women are targeted only as potential beneficiaries of linguistic integration measures for whom the state should promote “TV programs in specific daily hours to improve the knowledge and use of the Italian language and to get viewers closer to the Italian culture”.<sup>6</sup> Such tools specifically address only those female migrants who are not in the workforce and who have been granted family permits. In this sense, paradoxically, these tools better address the needs of Moroccan women – who are still scarcely active in the labour market – than those of Ukrainian women.

The gap left by national practices is, however, filled by local institutions which instead target female labour migrants. Within the official list of good practices addressing women migrant’s integration,<sup>7</sup> 19 out of 53 activities are dedicated to courses of Italian and more general cultural assimilation (e.g. teaching Italian civic values), 9 to health education and 6 to work training activities. The rest focuses on various topics, such as gender-based violence, self-defence, social exclusion, etc. Thus cultural assimilation and language issues are not the only issues tackled. The most active regions are Lazio (with 14 ongoing projects), Campania (11 projects), and Veneto (6 projects), Toscana, Piedmont and Marche (4 projects each). By looking at the type of intervention and region together, some interesting conclusions may be drawn. The Campania region comprises 67% of all courses dedicated to training female labour migrants in Italy. Training activities include family care-giving courses, sewing and darning classes, etc. These offerings clearly reflect the high concentration of Eastern European women in this region, and especially female Ukrainian labour migrants. In the Lazio region, activities are much more varied: health education (39%), Italian courses (31%), work activities (15%), etc. Some of these activities are specifically dedicated to the family reunification of female migrants, which reflect a much greater diversification of female migrants’ origins.

Moroccan migrants are by contrast targeted by the 2005 bilateral agreement, in which the parties pledge their support for activities that promote educational and vocational training as well as language courses in Morocco. As a result, Moroccan authorities give preferential treatment to Moroccan workers who participate in work and linguistic training activities when asking to enter Italy, in accordance with Italian labour market needs. In addition, as mentioned before, Moroccan women are implicitly targeted by integration measures aimed at integrating reunified women.

### 3.2 Institutional and policy framework of emigration/diaspora policies of Morocco and Ukraine

#### 3.2.1 An overview of Moroccan emigration and diaspora policies

##### *Historical evolution*

Historically, Morocco has long had an incisive policy towards its emigrants. With regard to the integration processes in particular, the attitude of the Moroccan government has radically changed over time, moving from a conservative to a supportive approach, the latter starting in the 1990s.

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> The list is available on the Ministry of the Interior’s website on: <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/en/best-practices/equal-opportunities/Documents/Buone%20pratiche%20per%20il%27integrazione%20delle%20donne%20-%20inglese.pdf> [Accessed 10 April 2015].

Since the beginning of large scale movements of Moroccans abroad in the 1960s, emigration has been perceived as a fundamental socio-economic resource for the state of origin. Emigration has indeed served as a safety valve for reducing unemployment at home as well as a financial resource in terms of remittances (Fargues 2004). These objectives were initially pursued through a coherent long-term political strategy applied in a twofold manner. First, the state pushed for sending increasing numbers of Moroccan workers abroad and for guaranteeing them a stable income. This led to the creation of recruitment agencies at a formal and informal level. Second, the state tried to maintain stable links with their migrants abroad in order to continue attracting remittances and – to a lesser extent – return migrants. To this aim, Moroccan authorities firmly opposed any kind of integration process for Moroccans abroad. For instance, King Hassan II was long against the concession of dual citizenship and discouraged naturalization processes.

At the same time, *ad hoc* migration offices were created – *Amicales* – with the aim of managing migrants' relations with their host countries, notably in matters of employment and social security. According to De Haas (2013), these offices also served to discourage Moroccans abroad from creating or affiliating with independent trade unions.

Since the 1990s, Moroccan diaspora policies have gradually changed due to a number of factors associated with a unique event: the birth of Moroccan diaspora. With the shift from a workers' migration to that of family reunification, the perpetuation of expatriate communities and the rise of generations born abroad (second and now third generation), the Moroccan state had to reinvent their emigration policy. As argued by Fargues (2004), "expatriate communities are a challenge for any nation state, as they escape its principle of political organisation which is based upon the actual spatial coincidence between the people and the territory under control". Conscious of their importance in economic and civic terms, Moroccan expatriates started to claim their civic, political and cultural rights through individual and collective actions.

In order 'not to let them go', and to address public opinion claims at home, the Moroccan policy has thus gradually adopted a more supportive approach in order to maintain close relationships with their expatriates. Moroccans living abroad were for the first time recognized as a group which need to be monitored and supported. As a result, the integration of migrants is today no longer seen as a threat but as a necessity to be dealt with so as 'not to let them go'.

Within such a renewed approach, Moroccan authorities have adopted a twofold strategy, given that there is no way to avoid migrants settling abroad. On the one hand, they softened legislation and norms to support migrants' integration abroad (dual citizenship/naturalization/integration agencies at destination). On the other hand, they have still tried to maintain close links with expatriates (voting rights/cultural measures).

A new legislation on voting rights and on naturalization and dual citizenship procedures was adopted. Meanwhile, a number of institutions were built-up to favour integration processes and to address expatriates' political claims. In 1990, the Moroccan government established a new Ministry for Moroccans residing abroad and the *Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocaines résidents à l'étranger*. With the aim of fostering links between Moroccans and home, the latter institution plays an important role at both migration points. At origin, it organizes courses and informational activities during the summer holidays for migrants abroad as well as for Moroccans who are potential migrants. Other important measures concern the diffusion of Arabic culture and economic activities (facilitating remittances, bilateral agreements, etc.).

#### *The political and civil dimension*

Affirming new political and civic rights is the pioneer instrument of the renewed Moroccan diaspora policy. It is directed at both explicitly supporting Moroccan integration abroad and reinforcing diaspora-origin links. With respect to the former, the core measures are facilitating naturalization and dual citizenship. In the 2000s, Moroccan migrants started to be encouraged to obtain foreign

nationality while retaining their (dual) Moroccan citizenship as a strategy to optimise circulation and simultaneously prevent the alienation of migrants and their descendants (De Haas 2013). Since the 2007 reform of the Nationality Code, dual citizenship has been granted at birth to children born to a Moroccan father and foreign woman or to a Moroccan mother and foreign man (provided that the law of the foreigner's country of origin enables him or her to pass on their nationality) (MPC 2013).

Concerning the reinforcement of diaspora-home links, the right to be elected and to vote was first recognised by King Mohamed VI in 2005 and formally recognised in the 2011 Constitution. According to Art. 17, Moroccans residing abroad enjoy full citizenship rights, including the right to elect and to be elected. This right is valid for national, regional and local elections. The law also includes specific modalities for enjoying this right abroad. Despite these assets, there is a large consensus today that the law has not been correctly implemented. Due to complex bureaucratic constraints, migrants still make large use of *proxy voting* procedures, which limits electoral participation to those who can/wish to delegate their vote.

#### *The socio-economic dimension*

Bilateral agreements are the pillar through which Moroccan work emigration has been managed for a long time with both European and Arab countries. These agreements include migrants' settlement conditions and rules for protecting and sending transfers abroad, which were particularly encouraged after the 1980s.

As mentioned above, the creation of associations dedicated to stimulating new out-migration, holiday visits and other forms of circular mobility have also been important instruments for continuing to attract remittances, which still represent the second largest source of hard currency after tourism receipts.

#### *The cultural and religious dimension*

The promotion of the Arabic language is the pillar of the cultural dimension. This is implemented through a number of Moroccan associations and initiatives and in particular through the project *Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine* (ELACM) within the above-mentioned *Fondation Hassan II*. These activities were first created in the 1970s, targeting Moroccan descendants residing abroad. The idea was to guarantee them the possibility of a smooth and effective reintegration after returning home. Over time, the return option has been gradually abandoned while ELACM has become considerably oriented towards the maintenance of links between Moroccan institutions and expatriates. Eighty-five percent of the Foundation Hassan II's financial resources are dedicated to this project, which employs 576 teachers annually for an average of more than 75,000 beneficiaries.

Religion is another core aspect of Moroccan diaspora policies. Since the 1990s, Foundation Hassan II has financed various activities by supporting mosques and associations that organize religious initiatives for migrants' descendants; sending imams abroad; and distributing materials (books of the Koran and reference manuals).

#### *Convergences and clashes between Moroccan and Italian policies*

The renewed Moroccan approach was thus developed in a twofold manner which may seem contradictory. Being conscious of a progressive settlement of Moroccans abroad, Moroccan institutions have started to invest more in diaspora skills while facilitating their integration abroad – especially from an economic and legal dimension. Bilateral agreements, the creation and spread of private and public supporting agencies at destination and at origin, the recognition of dual citizenship and the renewed approach towards naturalization are only some of the measures reflecting this pattern. On the other hand, in order 'not to let them go', Moroccan authorities pursued an explicit policy – especially from a cultural, political and religious dimension – aimed at maintaining strong links with the diaspora. In this sense, the spread of Arabic language among migrants' descendants, the extension of voting rights to expatriates and the large support given to religious initiatives are worth mentioning.

Looking at Moroccan and Italian migration history, it should be recalled that Italy represents only a recent – though important – destination compared with more ancient routes (e.g. migration to France). This implies that the Moroccan diaspora living in Italy has to a large extent benefited from increased support from Moroccan authorities, compared with other diasporas living in other European countries. The renewed Moroccan approach and the newly created Italian integration policy have thus evolved and changed in the same period.

Major convergences are certainly found in the labour market dimension. Beyond the bilateral agreement which guarantees Moroccan migrants priority in the Italian labour market, several other initiatives tend to converge. Specifically, Moroccan and Italian institutions show a high degree of collaboration in the domain of pre-departure programmes. For instance, in the framework of the “European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 2007-2013”, the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies promoted the development of a wide range of trainings *in loco*, in collaboration with local Moroccan institutions (such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Maritime Fishing) and other agencies. Unlike those developed for other nationalities (e.g. migrants from Sri Lanka and Mauritius), these programmes were focused on seasonal workers in order to allow them to “acquire knowledge and competencies [...] that fit Italian labour market characteristics” in sectors as tourism and agriculture. Such courses (each of them at least 104 hours) included a theoretical and practical training section, the teaching of Italian civic values and rules governing citizenship, security in the workplace and admission.

In contrast, if we look at the legal dimension, the recent support given by Moroccan authorities to naturalization processes is in contradiction with the still many constraints that migrants face to obtaining the Italian citizenship.

However, the major clash between Moroccan and Italian policies is to be found in the cultural and religious dimension. The renewed neo-assimilationist Italian approach (Caponio and Zincone 2011) towards migrants’ integration is certainly the opposite of the extremely significant support given by Moroccan authorities to supporting cultural and religious values among expatriates. Nevertheless, it should be noted that today, of the large amount of resources invested by the Moroccan state in these fields, only a minimal part is devoted to Moroccans living in Italy. In 2012, for example, the number of Arabic teachers employed abroad equalled 60.9% in France, 17.4% in Belgium, 10.2% in Spain and only 4.2% in Italy.

### *3.2.2 An overview of the emigration and diaspora policy of Ukraine*

#### *Historical evolution*

The widespread presence of Ukrainian migrants and their descendants all over the world has long pushed national authorities to recognize the diaspora’s needs and their conditions as a national priority. The 1996 Constitution already contains a range of provisions aimed at guaranteeing a number of rights to Ukrainian nationals residing abroad. Among others, the Constitution includes the right to return at any time, access to voting rights in national elections, social benefits, cultural and educational services and care and protection for emigrants. After 1996, other policy documents supported these positive approaches toward Ukrainians staying abroad, namely the National Programme “Ukrainian Diaspora” (1996-2000), the National Action Plan “Foreign Ukrainians” (2001-2005), the presidential decree “the Main Directions of Social Policy until 2004”, etc.

With respect to emigration policy, as in other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Ukraine’s policies towards its emigrants have been almost exclusively linked to labour market aspects. These policies are conducted at a state level though the role of NGO actors is notable.

In 2009, there was an attempt to elaborate a comprehensive policy and institutional framework in the field of external migration through the establishment of the State Migration Service, followed by the State Migration Policy concept in 2011. However, again, it only referred to the economic sphere of



migration, specifically targeting the potential return of Ukrainian migrants with the aim of providing them with incentives to invest at home, and facilitating such investments.

A more complex emigration policy design is found in the 2012 Draft Law on External labour Migration which, however, was not ratified by the previous Parliament. This law represents the first attempt to go beyond the economic rights of migrants, given the attention it pays to social and political provisions, namely welfare support for migrants' children and technical provisions for the protection of voting rights abroad and issues of reintegration upon migrants' return to Ukraine. Today, after the Maidan protests, measures on migration have not yet been considered under the Yatsenyuk government and at the time of writing, no plausible scenario can be advanced on this.

While as a whole there is a wide range of policy and legal documents that target diaspora members and labour migrants, the gap between policy provisions and implementation seems particularly large in the Ukrainian case. Then, a number of topics are regulated at the bilateral/multilateral level.

#### *The socio-economic dimension*

The conditions of Ukrainian workers abroad are regulated through bilateral/multilateral agreements (at the international level) as well as by national laws. As with the former, Ukraine is a party to a) several multilateral treaties on labour and the social protection of migrant workers, namely the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (since 2007), the Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of the Commonwealth of Independent States (since 2001); b) bilateral inter-governmental agreements in the field of social security for migrants (with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Latvia, Mongolia, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain); c) bilateral interstate and intergovernmental agreements on the employment of migrant workers (with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Libya, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Spain and Vietnam). The efficacy of these latter agreements was frequently called into question given the extremely complex bureaucratic procedures to access them. For instance, to date, although the agreement with Spain (2009) is one of the most elaborated, no single person has been hired through the adopted procedure thus far. In addition, Ukraine takes an active part in the international employment mediation system (employment licensing with the participation of more than 700 recruitment agencies covers from 80,000 to 90,000 employees from Ukraine annually; a majority of them are professional sailors hired by foreign ship owners from Cyprus, Greece, Germany, Liberia, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and the United States).

At the national level, the situation is more even more complex. Despite some declared provisions by the Cabinet of Ministers in the 2011 Plan of events for migrants' integration into Ukrainian society, no economic resources for *return migrants* were inserted in the most recent state budget (2013). In addition, no institutions were created to deal with return migration and reintegration; specifically, no preferential programs were developed for business start-ups for return migrants.

Concerning *remittances*, no specific tax exemption plan was put in place for those wishing to invest money at home. Conversely, some planned activities of the previous government were likely to worsen the position of households, depending on financial transfers from overseas. For instance, additional taxes on the purchase and sale of foreign currency, which would pertain to the inflow of funds coming to Ukraine by means of financial transfers to migrants' families, were constantly being discussed in the Parliament (for example, a project envisaging a 10-15% tax on such operations was proposed at one point). Furthermore, in November 2012, the National Bank adopted a regulation making it mandatory to convert foreign currency transfers sent to physical persons (residents and non-residents) from abroad at the Ukrainian interbank currency market, if those transfers are equal or exceed a fixed amount. This means that for every large financial transfer from abroad, the recipient would have to lose a considerable amount due to the currency exchange rate difference.

Another 'hot' topic regards pension and the *portability of migrants' social rights*, which are not fully regulated by current legal acts.

### *The cultural dimension*

Cultural and educational services are widespread in a number of Eastern European states, namely Poland, Slovakia and to a certain extent Russia, which together host the large majority of Ukrainian diaspora members. This suggests that in Ukraine, as in other CIS states, cultural (and religious) diaspora policies seem playing an important role.

However, as highlighted before the war by the Parliamentary Hearings of 3 July 2013, which were dedicated to the Ukrainian diaspora and involved a wide range of stakeholders, there is still a lot to be done. For instance, the 2006 Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting envisaged that “the government shall create conditions, by means of television and sound broadcasting, for meeting the cultural and informational needs of Ukrainian citizens as well as the needs of *ethnic Ukrainians residing abroad*”. According to the NGO representatives within the above mentioned Parliamentary Hearings of 3 July 2013, neither public nor private broadcasting fill this scope.<sup>8</sup>

### *The political dimension*

At a political level, the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution recognizes the right of voting from abroad at all levels. However, due to complex and long bureaucratic registration procedures as well as a lack of organisational support (especially in the EU), only a small share of potential voters has over time exerted their right (10% in the last elections). In addition, the decision of the Constitutional Court adopted on 5 April 2012 deprived Ukrainian citizens living abroad from their right to elect single-mandate members of the Parliament. These provisions, however, like many others after the Maidan protests, are likely to be extensively reviewed.

### *Convergences and clashes between Ukrainian and Italian policies*

Due to historical, ethnic, cultural and political reasons, Ukrainian emigration policies seem much more oriented towards (and efficient in) the post-Soviet space and EU Eastern European countries than in other EU countries. Members of the old ethnic diaspora are thus privileged beneficiaries of state actions while nothing or very few initiatives are envisaged for *new* labour migrants living in other EU states, such as Italy. In these countries, emigration policies are quite absent or – when they do exist – quite problematic (e.g. the project for taxing remittances). This issue applies to all dimensions. On the other hand, a very important role in the EU seems to be being played by NGOs, which in several cases work as intermediaries with Ukrainian authorities to convey migrants’ claims.<sup>9</sup>

For the time being, an examination of Ukrainian and Italian integration approaches shows no specific clashes or convergences that are worth highlighting. Even in the labour market dimension, there are neither bilateral agreements signed between the two countries nor specific measures undertaken by the Ukrainian government towards women migrants. From a political, cultural and religious perspective, again, there are no Ukrainian initiatives to be highlighted, except for the overall commitment of various NGOs that are devoted to a variety of issues, namely labour market insertion, the protection of female migrants’ rights at work, the fight against trafficked women, etc. What will come later? At the time of writing, no exhaustive answer can be given on the current and future developments of Ukrainian policies towards its emigrants.

---

<sup>8</sup> The Ukrainian public national television “did not become a carrier of historical truth and Ukrainian cultural heritage” while private broadcasters “often have an anti-Ukrainian and even anti-statehood nature” (see Parliamentary Hearings “Ukrainian labour migration: state, problems and solutions”, 3 July 2013, in Ivashchenko 2014).

<sup>9</sup> In summer 2013, for instance, the representatives of the state and Ukrainian migrants from 150 organisations based in 25 recipient countries (including the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Latvia, Portugal and Spain) met at the Parliamentary Hearings “Ukrainian labour migration: state, problems and solutions”. During these hearings, external labour migration became an issue on the political agenda and a range of policy recommendations were developed and approved by the Parliament on 5 November 2013 (for details, see Ivashchenko 2014).

#### 4. Integration trends of Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants in Italy

In order to measure the level of integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian immigrants living in Italy, the results of the *INTERACT Quantitative Study* are presented here (see Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015 for details). To this aim, Di Bartolomeo *et al.* (2015) built composite indicators of integration. They gauge integration in three dimensions – namely the labour market, education and access to citizenship – allowing for the ranking of different “migrant corridors”<sup>10</sup> along these lines. For each dimension, a wide range of basic indicators<sup>11</sup> were transformed and synthesized using the Principal Component Analysis. The resultant composite indicators (‘absolute’ indexes) are normalised between 0 (lowest integration) and 1 (highest integration). Indexes are then computed in relation to the performance of natives in each country of destination (‘gap’ indexes), thereby neutralising the effect of the national context. Results are presented in Figure 4 (the labour market), Figure 5 (education) and Figure 6 (access to citizenship).

In the labour market (Figure 4), these two communities show very similar and high performances both in absolute and relative terms, with no significant differences. This suggests that the destination country’s characteristics – and specifically the Italian labour market structure and migration history – play a fundamental role here. Unlike other EU countries, the Italian immigration system can still be seen as the ‘Mediterranean model of migration’, which is characterized by a high proportion of young first generation migrants who move predominantly for economic reasons, with very high activity and employment rates at destination, even higher than their native counterparts.<sup>12</sup> This indeed applies to both Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants, for whom employment rates respectively equal 67.3% and 62.8% (vs. 58.7% of people born in Italy) while activity rates stand at 72.8% and 69.7% (vs. 63.2% of Italians) (Table 7). With the exception of the most recent few years, labour migration has long been the first channel of migration to Italy for both communities, who have been attracted by the availability of a large spectrum of low-skilled jobs as well as by the possibility of being regularized a few years after entry. Both Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants are indeed largely employed in labour market *niches* (e.g. agriculture and household activities) where there is no competition with the Italian population.


---

<sup>10</sup> ‘Migrant corridors’ identify a number of migrant communities living in selected EU States.

<sup>11</sup> The following indicators were used: employment rate, unemployment rate, activity rate and over-qualification rate (labour market); highest educational attainment, school enrolment rate at age 15-25 and at age 25-35, % of international students at age 20-24 (education); citizenship acquisition rate, % of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (access to citizenship). For more details, see Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015.

<sup>12</sup> On the contrary, the ‘continental model of migration’, which includes traditional European countries of immigration, is typically characterized by lower activity and employment rates of immigrants who mainly arrived through family reunification channels.

**Figure 4. Integration Index of INTERACT migrant corridors, Labour Market most recent years (c. 2012)**



Source: Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015.

Conversely, origin determinants presumably have a lower impact on the labour market dimension. Specifically, bilateral agreements and preferential quotas assigned to Moroccans do not seem to make any difference with respect to labour market indicators such as activity and employment performances. As with unemployment rates, they differ only slightly, while the indicator where the main difference is observed is the over-qualification rate. In this case, education at home matters (as also showed by the education index, Figure 5). As mentioned above, migrants are over-represented in low-skilled jobs where they easily end up being overqualified (Reyneri and Fullin 2011). This is particularly true for Ukrainian migrants who, on average, are much more educated than Moroccan migrants and thus are more likely to be affected by over-qualification dynamics. In this sense, the difficult position of Ukrainian migrants is worsened not only by the fact that they do not show high levels of over-qualification but also because once in the labour market, it is extremely difficult for them to upgrade their position due to the scarcity of labour mobility dynamics that characterize their jobs (Venturini 2014).


**Table 7. Labour market basic indicators of people born in Ukraine, Morocco and Italy**

Country of birth	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Activity rate	Over-qualification rate
Ukraine	67.3%	7.6%	72.8%	81.4%
Morocco	62.8%	9.8%	69.7%	68.7%
Italy	58.7%	7.1%	63.2%	13.4%

Source: Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015.

The situation is different when one looks at the education index (Figure 5). Here, Moroccan migrants perform significantly worse than Ukrainian migrants.

**Figure 5. Integration Index of INTERACT migrant corridors, Education most recent years (c. 2012)**




Source: Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015.

Origin thus seems to have a stronger impact here. Ukrainian migrants, as with other migrants originating in post-Soviet states, show high educational performances, but frequently– as shown by previous results – end up in “over-qualification” jobs. In contrast, Moroccan migrants living in Italy tend to be less qualified. Again, it is not only their origin, but also their destination that is important. Indeed, Moroccan migrants living in Italy perform significantly worse than other Moroccans living in Belgium and Spain or other Maghreb migrants (Tunisians) living in France. It has been already noted that in these destinations, as in Italy, not only are Arab migrants’ educations lower than average, but the education level decreases over time, from old to young generations (Di Bartolomeo and Fargues 2015). Specific labour market needs have indeed attracted unskilled labour since the 1980s. Small-scale Italian industries and manufacturing activities (which provide most of the unskilled jobs) accounted for 33% of GDP from 2000 to 2010 and employed 49% of Maghreb migrants over the same period (Di Bartolomeo and Fargues 2015).

The degree of integration in the “access to citizenship” dimension (Figure 6) is most certainly connected to the degree of openness/restrictiveness of host citizenship laws and, accordingly, to the length of a migrant’s presence in the country. Our results confirm that Italy is still one of the countries where getting citizenship is one of the main constraints for migrants for both recent communities (Ukrainians) as well as well-established ones (Moroccans). Origin, thus, seems to have a very limited importance here.

**Figure 6. Integration Index of INTERACT migrant corridors, Access to citizenship most recent years (c. 2012)**



Source: Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015.

#### 4.1 Complementary findings from the ISMU Sample Survey

The integration of Moroccan and Ukrainians is further analysed through the results of the ISMU Sample Survey. Its findings are largely complementary to the results obtained by the Interact Quantitative Survey with regard to two main aspects. First, it allows us to focus on four other dimensions of integration, namely the cultural, economic, political and social domains. Second, it looks at the impact of origin-country determinants at a micro-level, in terms of economic, affective and familial ties between migrants and their country of destination.

The ISMU Sample survey was conducted within 32 territorial units (municipalities, metropolitan areas and provinces), representative of the five different Italian geographic divisions, and through a structured self-filled questionnaire (PAPI technique) (for details see Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009). More than 12,000 adult foreigners were interviewed, regardless of their legal status (regular and irregular), between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009.

Like the Interact Quantitative Study, the ISMU study produces composite indicators of integration according to dimension. Unlike INTERACT indicators, ISMU indicators measure and compare the integration between migrant communities living in Italy (i.e. at a national level) but not between migrant corridors (i.e. at an international level). In both cases, it is possible to compare the performance of Moroccan migrants with that of Ukrainian migrants.

In the Survey, about 1,400 Moroccan and 800 Ukrainian citizens were interviewed. Their level of integration is compared in the following dimensions (Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009):

- a) cultural dimension; basic indicators: knowledge and use of the Italian language; access to and interest in the Italian News; sense of belonging to Italian society; self-perception of well-being in Italy; level of sharing some of the Italian ideals;
- b) social dimension; basic indicators: friendship relations; participation in group-associations; level of appreciation of the Italian lifestyle; marital and fertility intentions within the Italian context;
- c) political dimension; basic indicators: legal status; opinion about the importance of acquiring Italian citizenship;
- d) economic dimension; basic indicators: housing and occupational conditions; saving capacity.

Methodologically, the single modalities of each variable have been ordered according to an increasing level of integration. For each variable, the higher an individual's score, the larger the share of people who live in a worse condition of integration. The lower the score, the greater the share of people who are in an equal or better condition of integration. Scores of all variables have been summarized by an arithmetic mean within each of the four observed dimensions in order to estimate the respective indexes of integration: cultural integration, social integration, political integration, economic integration. The values of the indexes were normalized between 0 and 1, which correspond with absence and maximum integration, respectively (for a detailed description of the method, see Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009).


Focusing our attention on Moroccan and Ukrainian groups, Figure 7 shows the rankings of the most representative immigrant groups according to the scores in the four dimensions of integration described above.

Generally speaking, Moroccans are placed in an average position on the list. Compared with Ukrainians, they show a lower performance in the cultural and economic dimensions, while they better perform in the social and political ones. Their worst position is observed in the economic dimension, given their uncertain housing and occupational conditions and their low saving capacity. Moroccans also achieve a level of integration below immigrants' mean value in the cultural dimension showing, among other things, a modest use and knowledge of the Italian language. Conversely, they rank high with respect to social and political integration. Moroccans have stronger network relationships and higher levels of participation in group associations than the other groups of immigrants. Moreover, they declare strong marital and fertility intentions within the Italian context and positive opinions about the importance of acquiring Italian citizenship; in addition, they have a high level of appreciation of the Italian lifestyle. This group, which is one of the most traditional and stable in Italy, is characterized by high levels of regularity. Ukrainians generally have low scores across all dimensions of integration. Cultural integration shows the best performance for this group although with values only slightly higher than the average for immigrants. They show a better knowledge and use of the Italian language than Moroccans. Moreover, they have a good sense of belonging to Italian society. Like Moroccans, Ukrainians have uncertain housing and occupational conditions (and thus have low economic integration).<sup>13</sup> Compared to Moroccans, they actively participate very little in the Italian society (thus having low social integration) and show low interest in acquiring Italian citizenship (thus having the lowest political integration of all immigrant groups).

---

<sup>13</sup> Here, it is important to highlight that this dimension includes indicators other than the labour market indicators in the INTERACT Quantitative Study. In particular, housing and saving capacity performances are introduced here.

**Figure 7. Average immigrants' level of integration according to four dimensions and selected origin countries. Italy, 2008-09**



Source: our elaborations on ISMU data, 2009.

The *ISMU Sample Survey* is also particularly suitable for INTERACT's purposes, namely as it detects the role played by origin determinants at the micro-level. Specifically, the survey contains a number of questions which investigate the roles played by the familial, economic and affective ties that migrants keep with their state of origin. As shown below, linear regression models verify these roles' associations with all four dimensions of integration for Moroccans and Ukrainians separately (Table 8). Results have been controlled for the following variables: basic demographics (sex, age), migration-related data (length of stay), territorial data (municipality and macro-area of residence) and human-capital data (level of education).

Interesting results are observed in Table 8. Persistent, positive and significant coefficients for the *length of stay* are observed in all models: the longer the presence in the country, the higher the level of integration in all dimensions. The *age of respondents* shows significant and slightly negative coefficients in all four aspects of integration with few exceptions (for instance, it does not affect the social and political integration of Moroccans): the older the migrants, the more problematic their integration is. The joint discussion of such results can provide policy-makers with a better analysis of the time effects on integration. Generally speaking, immigrants' integration dimensions increase during their stay in the host country; however, sufficient time does not pass to reach good levels of integration because age moves in an opposite way with a negative return relative to the scale of the process. For this reason, investing on the integration of immigrants at very young ages is indispensable. *Women* are generally more significantly integrated than men in three out of four indicators; higher levels of *educational attainment*<sup>14</sup> are also associated with higher levels of integration. One can observe no clear geographical pattern according to the *macro-area of residence* and no unidirectional patterns looking at the *sizes of the residence municipality*.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> We consider compulsory school a 'low' level of education; college or high school a 'middle' level of education; university a 'high' level of education.

<sup>15</sup> We consider: the metropolitan provincial capitals with at least 250,000 citizens to be 'large' municipalities; the other provincial capitals 'medium' ones; the other municipalities 'small' ones.



**Table 8. Immigrants’ determinants of integration according to four dimensions. Regression analysis. Italy, 2008-09**

Variables	Categories	Cultural integration				Social integration				Political integration				Economic integration			
		Ukraine		Morocco		Ukraine		Morocco		Ukraine		Morocco		Ukraine		Morocco	
		Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.
<b>MIGRANTS - ORIGIN TIES</b>																	
<b>Family Ties</b>																	
Type of family	Single	-0.04	*	0.009		-0.09	***	0.003		-0.09	***	-0.06	***	-0.11	***	-0.11	***
	Complete	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Divided	-0.06	***	-0.06	***	-0.09	***	-0.05	***	-0.08	***	-0.06	***	-0.1	***	-0.09	***
<b>Economic Ties</b>																	
Remittances in the country of origin	Regularly	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Occasionally	0.029		0.027	*	-0.01		0.015		0.048	**	0.014		0.064	***	0.151	***
	Never	0.004		0.021	*	0.001		0.017		0.019		0.029	***	0.025		0.07	***
<b>Affective Ties</b>																	
Sense of belonging to the country of origin	Much	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Somewhat	0.044	*	0.032	**	0.034	**	0.031	**	0.028		0.009		0.038	**	0.006	
	Few	0.053	**	0.068	***	0.066	***	0.063	***	0.037		0.059	***	0.032		0.011	
Interest in the country of origin	Nothing	0.059		0.101	**	0.003		0.048		0.016		0		-0.07		-0.08	
	Much	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Somewhat	0.011		0.005		0.043	***	0.024	**	0.045	**	0.022	**	0.043	**	0.004	
Nothing	Few	0.094	***	0.009		0.069	**	0.051	**	0.007		0.023		0.098	***	-0.05	
	Nothing	0.167	***	0.064	**	0.16	**	0.09	***	0.036		0.015		-0.07		-0.05	
<b>“CONTROL” VARIABLES</b>																	
Age		-0	*	-0	***	-0	***	0		-0	***	-0		-0	***	-0	***
Len. of stay		0.014	***	0.022	***	0.017	***	0.016	***	0.023	***	0.023	***	0.014	**	0.019	***
Len. of stay sq.		-0		-0	***	0		-0	***	-0		-0	***	0		-0	***
Sex	Men	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Women	0.072	***	0.054	***	0.037	*	0.047	***	0.054	***	0.052	***	0.032		0.017	
Macro-area of residence	North	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Centre	0.036	**	-0.01		0.011		0.031	***	-0		-0.02		-0.02		-0.02	
	South	0.052	***	-0.01		0.049	***	0.025	**	0.038	**	-0.02		-0.06	***	-0.05	***
Municipality of residence	Large	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Middle	0		0.007		0.048	***	0.018	*	0.034	*	0.072	***	0.02		0.065	***
	Small	-0.05	***	-0.04	**	-0.02		-0.02	*	-0		0.058	***	-0.01		0.037	*
Education	Low	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Middle	0.016		0.092	***	-0		0.041	***	-0.03		0.033	***	0.038	**	0.057	***
	High	0.061	***	0.107	***	0.021		0.056	***	-0.03	*	0.029	**	0.057	***	0.054	***

Notes: \*p-value<0.1; \*\*p-value<0.05; \*\*\*p-value<0.01. Source: our elaborations on ISMU data, 2009.

Looking at migrants' origin ties, the first covariate considers the *family ties* of respondents. Both Moroccans and Ukrainians have significant and negative lower propensities for integration in all four observed dimensions when they present broken-families<sup>16</sup> rather than unified family ties. Interestingly, the same occurs for single individuals, who also show negative coefficients even if the effect is much more evident among Ukrainians than Moroccans.<sup>17</sup> The presence of the whole family in Italy somehow induces the immigrants to favour a positive process of integration.

*Economic ties* are proxied by the frequency with which immigrants send remittances to the origin country. The results show different paths of significance in comparison to the family ties mentioned above, even if the meanings of the coefficients move in the same direction: the immigrants who send remittances only occasionally or never (i.e. they have respectively weak or absent ties) have a higher probability of being integrated than the ones who provide remittances regularly (i.e. they have strong ties). Obviously the highest coefficient values are observed for economic integration and subsequently for political integration, while the frequency of remittances slightly affects the other two integration dimensions. In other words, economic ties mainly affect a specific individual dimension of integration. In this case, similar results are found for both Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants.

Finally, *affective ties* concern the following two variables in the model: the sense of belonging to and involvement in what happens in the country of origin. The lower the sense of belonging among Ukrainians and Moroccans, the higher the level of cultural and social integration. The same applies to political and economic integration but with low levels of significance. Also in this case, the covariate included in the model affects the dimensions of the observed integration differently. The latter variable included in the model presents higher coefficients among Ukrainians than Moroccans. As far as the sense of belonging is concerned, a weak or absent involvement in what happens in the country of origin produces a higher probability of being integrated in the destination country.

As a whole, these findings show that the lower the ties with the origin country, the higher the level of integration in the society of destination. This applies to a different extent to all kinds of ties (economic, affective, and familial) and to all dimensions for both Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants. Migrants thus seem less inclined to integrate when they have stronger ties with the origin country.

In order to look more in depth at how these patterns are derived, the following paragraph is dedicated to the results of the *INTERACT Qualitative Survey*, which focuses on the complex links between institutional actors at destination and origin and their roles in determining integration outcomes at destination.

---

<sup>16</sup> Immigrants with broken families have left part of their family behind in the country of origin.

<sup>17</sup> Moroccan singles are not significantly different from the reference group in social and cultural integration.


## 5. The role of organisations supporting migrants’ integration in Italy: results of the INTERACT Qualitative Survey

The qualitative INTERACT exploratory survey, though not statistically representative, allows for a better understanding of the previously mentioned results. The survey was conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. It targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU countries of destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey sheds light on how civil society organisations’ activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. It also shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society.

In this section we will focus on the survey section, which deals with the links between the countries and communities of origin. The number of organisations which participated in the survey equalled 15 organisations affiliated with Ukrainian migrants and 11 affiliated with Moroccan migrants. The majority (11) was comprised of associations. It is worth mentioning that no organisation had an institutional affiliation (with governmental institutions or political parties) and there were also no trade unions. Our results are thus characterized by a strong bottom-up and civic approach.

Organisations provide migrants with a variety of services and only rarely focus on a specific dimension (Figure 8). The majority of services are dedicated to the labour market and education dimensions. Other important dimensions are language and residential integration. Social interaction and political and civic participation services are also covered by Ukrainian organisations; only in one case are they addressed by Moroccan organisations. Religion is absent in both cases, despite the strong engagement of Moroccan diaspora policies in this area. “Access to nationality” is not covered by Moroccan organisations, and only one Ukrainian organisation helps migrants in this sense.

**Figure 8. Dimensions covered by organizations by type and migrants’ nationality, values in %**



Source: INTERACT Qualitative Survey.

Based on Figure 8, the attention here is focused on the dimensions that are more highly represented by organisations serving both nationalities, namely the labour market, education, language and residential integration. Accordingly, Table 9 summarizes the type of services offered by organisations in the labour market, education and language dimensions.

#### *Labour market*

In the labour market dimension, the core service provided by Moroccan organisations is providing migrants with information about available jobs as well as about the legal and institutional Italian frameworks. The organisations thus serve as an intermediary between local market agents and migrants. In the Ukrainian case, by contrast, migrants are provided with a wide range of services without a prevailing one. Nevertheless, in both cases, respondents say that the biggest impact their organisation has on migrants' labour market outcomes is on helping them finding employment. No – or a very scarce – Impact is noted on skills' matching, wages, or career advancement.

Regarding their perception about the role of the country of origin in the integration process, a significant part of respondents give large importance to both associations based in the country of origin and to official pre-departure programs. On the contrary, governmental policies at origin are seen as relevant by Moroccan organisations but not by Ukrainian organisations. Actually, the lack of coherence and engagement of Ukrainian emigration policies in the labour market is frequently invoked by Ukrainian NGOs as a main constraint to the improvement of Ukrainian migrants' working conditions' (Ivashchenko 2014).

#### *Education*

In the education dimension, the large majority of organisations are devoted to informing migrants about existing opportunities for studying abroad. Again, the role of organisations as informers and intermediaries is confirmed here as well. In the Moroccan case, however, organisations are also involved in lobbying institutions at destination in order to claim migrants' rights with respect to diploma recognition. As noted above, in the Moroccan case, the very low integration in the educational dimension is largely attributable to two core indicators: a) the low average level of education achieved and b) the scarce number of international students. Thus the engagement of organisations in these two directions seems coherent and appropriate. Performance outcomes (homework assistance, summer schools, etc.) are by contrast less important in both cases. This is a particularly serious issue considering the 'low' educational profile of Moroccan migrants, who are thus scarcely able to help their children navigate the Italian educational system.

**Table 9. Detailed types of services provided by organisations to Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants, by dimension (labour market, education and language) and migrants' nationality**

	Morocco	Ukraine
<b>Labour market</b>		
Getting information about available jobs	4	8
Information about the legal framework/institutional setting at destination	3	7
Lobbying for recognition of qualifications	3	4
Support for training	3	3
Lobbying for legal incentives/priorities	1	4
Protecting workers' rights in the process of recruitment abroad	2	0
Incentives to employers to hire migrants	0	1
Others	3	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Education</b>		
Informing immigrants about student opportunities abroad	6	9
Lobbying the institutions at destination to recognise diplomas from the countries of origin	2	4
Organising summer schools for children of immigrants	2	3
Providing homework assistance	2	2
Training teachers to be sent to the country of origin	1	0
Others	2	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Language</b>		
Translating	2	6
Teaching future immigrants the official language of destination	2	2
Teaching immigrants the official language of the origin country	0	2
Lobbying institutions at destination to support the teaching of the official language of country of origin	0	1
Training language teachers at origin to be sent abroad	0	0
Lobbying institutions at origin to support the teaching of the language of destination to potential immigrants	0	0
Others	2	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>14</b>

Source: INTERACT Qualitative Survey.

### *Language*

As far as the language dimension is concerned, the core service in the Ukrainian case is that of translation. Since associations are a main vehicle of information, it is clear that translation and comprehension are two core services that relate to all aspects of everyday life. Language courses (both Italian and Ukrainian) are the other two important services provided. In the Moroccan case, only a few services are provided, but it is worth mentioning that they include Italian language courses and translation activities.

Interestingly enough, the use of the origin language in the labour market is considered much more useful for Ukrainian migrants than for Moroccans. In the latter case, Arabic is considered of low importance in all employment places except for those engaged in tourism activities. Ukrainian is instead considered important in several job places, namely translation and cultural production, in multi-national companies, international organisations, etc. The lack of importance of Arabic is probably more related to the overall employment conditions of Moroccans in Italy – who are mainly employed in low-skilled jobs – than to Arabic *per se*. In the case of Ukrainian migrants, the results are

not easily interpretable. It is likely that respondents may have confounded the Ukrainian language with Russian.

### *Residential integration*

According to INTERACT's *Qualitative Survey* results, the impact of the country of origin is negligible in the residential integration dimension. In both cases, respondents declare that they have observed no actions by the institutions of the country of origin to establish organisations (such as official representations, schools, religious institutions, etc.) in areas primarily inhabited by immigrants. The impact of the country of origin is also absent in the way that migrants secure housing at destination. The tools that are considered important are in fact personal and familial in both cases. Interestingly enough, for the first time, funding by religious networks appears to be important.

## **6. Conclusions on integration levels and the role of *origin determinants***

This report looked at the level of integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy across a large number of dimensions. It tried to shed light on the levels and determinants of integration with a specific focus on the role played by origin factors. Such factors include the ties between migrants and their country of origin, the characteristics of migrants coming from specific countries, diaspora and emigration policies at origin and the engagement and role of organisations. To this aim, three sorts of data have been used. First, a survey of the legal and analytical frameworks of emigration and diaspora policies (but also of integration policies at destination) was conducted. Second, to quantitatively assess the level of integration in a number of dimensions, a quantitative section was developed. It was based on two quantitative analyses, namely the *INTERACT Quantitative Study* (Di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2015) and the *ISMU Sample Survey* (Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009). The latter was also employed to evaluate the association between integration and migrants' origin ties at the micro level. Third, the results of the *INTERACT Qualitative Survey* have been used to analyse the roles and opinions that NGOs have on migrants' integration processes.

This final chapter sums up the main findings and proposes a coherent framework of integration levels and determinants with a special focus on origin factors by dimension.

As a whole, origin and destination macro-determinants of integration have different effects and strengths depending on the dimension. In the *labour market*, at an international level, both Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy show high levels of integration. Only a few migrant corridors perform better (e.g. Indian migrants in UK; Russian and Turkish migrants in Germany). Once controlled for natives' performances (using the gap index), Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants are even at the top positions of the Labour Market Index.

These extremely positive performances seem due more to destination than to origin factors. Indeed, with few exceptions, similar rankings are found in all migrant communities living in the same destination country while, on the contrary, different performances are shown by the same national group living in different contexts. As mentioned above, Italy's labour market specificities and migration history seem to largely explain this pattern. Attracted by a huge demand for low-qualified workers in certain economic sectors, migration to Italy is still composed largely of first-generation working migrants with very high employment and activity rates, higher than those of natives. The latter characteristics are certainly driving factors in our results.

Conversely, origin determinants presumably have a lower impact. Specifically, bilateral agreements and preferential quotas assigned to Moroccans do not seem to make any difference with respect to integration. The performance of Moroccan migrants is not significantly different from that of Ukrainian migrants either in terms of the Labour Market Index or basic indicators. On the other hand, the role played by organisations appears relevant to helping migrants find employment – not good employment, not well-remunerated employment but *just* employment. These results indeed refer

to the condition of migrants in terms of labour market outcomes but do not look at other aspects of migrants' labour and economic life, namely wages, job conditions, etc., which are instead the focus of the economic dimension of the ISMU survey.

The ISMU survey allows for a deeper examination of the *economic* integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in Italy with respect to additional aspects (other than those related to the labour market), i.e. housing, saving capacity, etc. In Italy, compared with other migrant communities, Moroccans and Ukrainians suffer from very poor economic outcomes. They are in relatively low positions as origin characteristics represent a major constraint compared with other nationalities. This is due to a variety of reasons. Among others, INTERACT's *Qualitative Survey* respondents confirmed that – in both cases – migrant organisations have no or very scarce impacts on economic aspects other than helping migrants find a job.

In the *education* dimension, the groups do differ. At an international level, Ukrainians living in Italy show good levels of integration, once controlled for natives' performance. Moroccan migrants instead rank last in both absolute and gap indexes. In all other countries of destination but UK (where selective policies do likely make the difference), migrants' performances differ largely according to the country of origin. Origin determinants – in terms of conditions at home – thus seem to prevail here. Without exception in the absolute index and with only two exceptions in the gap index, migrants from the Southern-Eastern Mediterranean all rank in the low-median part of the indexes, whereas the higher rankings are comprised of migrants born in the rest of the world. On the other hand, the roles of origin policies and NGOs are unclear. According to the *INTERACT Qualitative Survey*, much of the effort that organisations put into helping Moroccans in Italy is devoted to supporting migrants who are studying abroad as well as increasing recognition of diplomas and degrees. Actually, the *INTERACT Quantitative Study* reveals and confirms that these two domains are the most critical in the Moroccan case. It is worth highlighting that performance outcomes are absent both in terms of assessment (they are not inserted in the Education Index) and policy (no mention is found in the *INTERACT Qualitative Survey*).

Not surprisingly, the *access to citizenship* dimension is largely linked to destination determinants. The lowest rankings in the Index are Moroccan migrants living in Italy and Spain and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy.

In addition, as shown by the *ISMU Sample Survey*, *cultural* integration is a main obstacle to Moroccan integration, a result which is probably also linked to the clash between Moroccan and Italian integration policies in cultural terms. On the other hand, Ukrainians are found to be in a difficult position with respect to *social* and *political* integration. The former can be partially attributed to working conditions (caregivers who cohabit with their employers are often deprived of their autonomy and independence), while the latter is likely to be attributable to the fact that massive migration from Ukraine is a quite recent phenomenon. As a matter of fact, Ukrainians' position, when compared to other migrant communities (e.g. the oldest), tends being weaker. It is worth noting, however, that both dimensions are almost entirely absent from Italy's political agenda integration at the state level.

Finally, this report finds interesting results from another mechanism which may potentially impact integration, namely existing *ties* between migrants and their countries of origin. How are they related to migrants' integration? Do they foster or constrain it? The *ISMU Survey* allowed us to evaluate the association between migrants' ties with origin countries and integration at destination. Specifically, we looked at the association between four dimensions of integration (cultural, economic, political and social) and family, economic and affective ties with the country of origin. Here, results are very clear: the lower the ties with the country of origin, the higher the probability of being integrated. This applies – to a different extent – to all dimensions and ties.

## References

- Ait Madani, F. 2014. *Policy and institutional frameworks – Moroccan Country Report*, INTERACT Research Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Unpublished.
- Ambrosetti, E., and A. Paparusso 2012-13. Which Future for Migration in Europe? A Brief Analysis of the EU Migration Policies in the Mediterranean Area, *Annali del Dipartimento di Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza*, n.s., no. 1: 13-28. Available on: [http://www.memotef.uniroma1.it/sites/dipartimento/files/ElenaAmbrosetti-AngelaPaparusso\\_13-38.pdf](http://www.memotef.uniroma1.it/sites/dipartimento/files/ElenaAmbrosetti-AngelaPaparusso_13-38.pdf) [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- Bonifazi, C., M.G. Caruso, C. Conti, S. Strozza 2003. Measuring migrant integration in the nineties: the contribution of field surveys in Italy, *Studi Emigrazione*, no. 152: 855-884.
- Bonifazi, C., and S. Strozza 2003. Introduction, *Studi Emigrazione*, no. 152: 690-696.
- Bonifazi, C., and S. Strozza 2006. Conceptual Framework and Data Collection in International Migration. In: G. Caselli, J. Vallin, G. Wunsch (eds.), *Demography: Analysis and Synthesis. A Treatise in Population*, vol. 4. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 537-554.
- Bonifazi, C., S. Strozza, and M. Vitiello 2012. *Measuring integration in a reluctant immigration country: the case of Italy*. In: R. Bijl, A. Verweij (eds.), *Measuring and monitoring immigrant integration in Europe*. The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research/SCP, pp. 183-199.
- Caneva, E. 2014. *The integration of migrants in Italy: an overview of policy instruments and actors*, INTERACT Research Report 2014/05, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.
- Caponio, T. (ed.) 2013. *Dall'ammissione all'inclusione: verso un approccio integrato? Un percorso di approfondimento comparativo a partire da alcune recenti esperienze europee*, Research Report FIERI on the behalf of CNEL, Turin: FIERI, september.
- Caponio, T., and G. Zincone 2011. *WP2 – The national policy frame for the Integration of Newcomers in Italy* [online], PROSINT – Promoting Sustainable Policies for Integration, Wien, available on: [http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project\\_material/PROSINT/Reports/IT\\_WP2\\_Final.pdf](http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project_material/PROSINT/Reports/IT_WP2_Final.pdf) [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- Carfagna, S., D. Gabrielli, M.P. Sorvillo, S. Strozza 2008. *Changes of status of immigrants in Italy: results of a record-linkage on administrative sources* [online], Paper presented at European Population Conference, Barcelona, EAPS 2008, 9-12 July, available on: <http://epc2008.princeton.edu/papers/80562> [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- Cesareo, V., and G. C. Blangiardo 2009. *Indici di integrazione. Un'indagine empirica sulla realtà migratoria italiana*. Milan: Franco Angeli.
- De Haas, H. 2013. Migration and Development: Policy lessons from the Moroccan Experience. In: J. Cortina, and E. Ochoa-Reza (eds.), *Managing Migration: Maximizing Development and Well-Being in Sending and Receiving Nations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Di Bartolomeo, A., S. Kalantaryan and S. Bonfanti. 2015. *Measuring Integration of Migrants: A Multivariate Approach*, INTERACT Research Report 2015/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.
- Di Bartolomeo, A., and Ph. Fargues 2015. The geography of highly-skilled Arab migration. In Ph. Fargues and A. Venturini (eds.), *Arab migrants and the global competition for talents*, London: IB Tauris.



- Fargues, Ph. 2004. Arab Migration to Europe: Trends and Policies, *International Migration Review*, 38, no. 4: 1348-1371.
- Gabrielli, D., S. Strozza, and E. Todisco 2009. *Country Report Italy* [online], Promoting Comparative Quantitative Research in the Field of Migration and Integration in Europe (PROMINSTAT), available on:  
[http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project\\_material/PROMINSTAT\\_File\\_Exchange/PROMINSTAT\\_Italy.pdf](http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project_material/PROMINSTAT_File_Exchange/PROMINSTAT_Italy.pdf) [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- Golini, A., and S. Strozza 2006. *L'immigrazione straniera: indicatori e misure di integrazione*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Ivashchenko, K. 2014. *Policy and institutional frameworks – Country Report – Ukraine*. INTERACT Research Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Unpublished.
- Joppke, C. 2007. Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe, *West European Politics*, 30, no. 1: 1-22.
- Lunaria. 2014. *I diritti non sono un costo. Immigrazione, welfare e finanza pubblica*. Rome: Lunaria.
- Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, Ministero dell'Interno, Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della ricerca. 2010. *ITALIA 2020. Piano per l'integrazione nella sicurezza. Identità e Incontro*. Rome: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, Ministero dell'Interno, Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della ricerca. Available on:  
[http://www.lavoro.gov.it/AreaComunicazione/Eventi/Documents/pianointegrazione\\_web.pdf](http://www.lavoro.gov.it/AreaComunicazione/Eventi/Documents/pianointegrazione_web.pdf) [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- MPC (Migration Policy Centre). 2013. The legal framework of Migration in Morocco. In Ph. Fargues, *EU Neighbourhood Migration Report*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, pp. 171-180. Available on:  
[http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27394/MPC\\_EU\\_NeighbourhoodMigrationReport2013\\_web.pdf?sequence=5](http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27394/MPC_EU_NeighbourhoodMigrationReport2013_web.pdf?sequence=5) [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- OECD. 2014. *Jobs for Immigrants (Vol. 4): Labour Market Integration in Italy*. OECD Publishing. Available on: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264214712-en> [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- Papavero, G., A. Menonna, and M.P. Caria 2009. Aspetti metodologici e organizzativi. In: V. Cesareo, G.C. Blangiardo (eds.), *Indici di integrazione. Un'indagine empirica sulla realtà migratoria italiana*, Milan: FrancoAngeli.
- Paterno, A., S. Strozza, and L. Terzera 2006. *Sospesi tra due rive. Migrazioni e insediamenti di albanesi e marocchini*. Milan: Franco Angeli.
- Reyneri, E., and F. Fullin 2011. Labour Market Penalties of New Immigrants in New and Old Receiving West European Countries, *International Migration*, 49, no. 1: 31-57.
- Strozza, S. 2010. International migration in Europe in the first decade of the 21st century, *Rivista Italiana di Economia Demografia e Statistica*, 64, no. 3: 7-43.
- Strozza, S., and E. Zucchetti 2006 (eds.). *Il Mezzogiorno dopo la grande regolarizzazione, 2, Vecchi e nuovi volti della presenza migratoria*, Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006.
- Unterreiner, A., and A. Weinar 2014. *The Conceptual Framework of the INTERACT Project*, INTERACT Research Report 2014/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.

- Venturini, A. 2014. Integrazione senza “cittadinanza”? [online]. In Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute (ed.), *BACKGROUND PAPER – Tre aspetti cruciali per comprendere il future delle migrazioni internazionali nell’Unione Europea*, Deliberation workshop POLITICALLY.EU “l’Europa e le politiche di migrazione”, Naples, 31 March, available on: [http://www.politically.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Background\\_Paper\\_POLITICALLY-EU\\_Migrazione.pdf](http://www.politically.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Background_Paper_POLITICALLY-EU_Migrazione.pdf) [Accessed 10 April 2015].
- Zincone, G. 2000. Introduzione e sintesi. Un modello di integrazione ragionevole. In G. Zincone (ed.), *Primo rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 13-120.
- Zincone, G. 2011. The Case of Italy. In: G. Zincone, R. Penninx and M. Borkert (eds.), *Migration Policymaking in Europe: the Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 247-290.