

Mobilities across European Banglascapes

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Summary

Bangladeshi migration to Europe began as early as the 1600s, when young Bengali men worked as deckhands on British ships bound for London. The British capital became home to what would become, in the following centuries, the largest Bangladeshi community in Europe.

However, in the 1970s, the United Kingdom and other continental European countries that had traditionally been destinations for international migration (e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Switzerland), tightened their control over new arrivals. At the same time, Mediterranean European countries, which had recently undergone profound social and economic transformations, established themselves as new destinations for migration from the “Global South.” This meant that by the 1990s, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal were among the main destinations for Bangladeshi migration to Europe.

The next twenty years saw the 2008 global economic crisis (which hit southern European countries particularly hard) as well as changes in the expectations and the legal and family status of Bangladeshi migrants in Mediterranean Europe (the second generation was born, and the first generation had acquired European passports). Hence, a new migration began to take shape, with Bangladeshi communities again moving to London, but this time from Mediterranean Europe.

However, the migratory mobility of these Bangladeshi Europeans has not ended: while some have settled in the United Kingdom, even acquiring British citizenship, many others, because of the disillusionments concerning the United Kingdom as well as the implementation of Brexit, have decided to retrace their steps partially, returning to Mediterranean Europe or settling in other European countries. Meanwhile, many unskilled Bangladeshi workers who previously migrated to Libya also find themselves undertaking a further migration, crossing the Mediterranean to claim asylum in Italy. This demonstrates the ever-increasing complexity of interwoven mobilities across European Banglascapes.

Keywords: Bangladeshi diaspora, European Banglascapes, Bangladesh, probashi, bidesh, London, Mediterranean Europe, Italy, Libya, onward migration

Subjects: Migration/Immigration/Diaspora, South Asia, World/Global/Transnational

Ranabir Samaddar describes Bengal as “an insecure environment, inhabited by insecure families[,] . . . a land of fast footed people, people who would not accept the loss of their dream, who would move on to newer and newer lands.”¹

As of the early 21st century, these fast-footed people's extreme mobility has been linked to this precariousness, especially for the subordinate classes in Bangladeshi society, who try to improve their material conditions by migrating from rural to urban areas or by crossing the country's borders. Those with greater economic and social resources are driven instead by the desire for upward social mobility and the feeling of "missing a huge opportunity" if they remain outside of the advanced capitalist societies of the Global North.² This creates a migratory story linking 21st-century Bangladesh to Europe.

The way in which this migratory story developed was of course greatly influenced by international economic, political, and social dynamics—first, by British colonialism that led to the development of intense and continual economic, commercial, and cultural exchanges between the colonial periphery and the center of the British Empire, which drove migratory movements from what until 1947 was East Bengal to the United Kingdom and which have continued to guide them. Next, this story was developed by characteristics resulting from political and economic changes within Bangladesh and the redefinition of its international alliances and diplomatic relations, primarily with members of the former Eastern bloc that have historically played a key role in opening or limiting migratory channels toward Europe.³ Finally, this story's development was influenced by the changes taking place in European migration destinations. Beginning from the first oil shock and the exhaustion of the postwar economic development cycle that had driven their growth for thirty years, the United Kingdom and other western European countries made entry and permanent residence increasingly difficult. Meanwhile, there was a transformation in Mediterranean European countries that, after previously being countries (principally) of emigration—exporting their labor force—became countries (principally) of immigration—importing workers and their families.

As will be shown in this article, however, the *European Banglascapes*—this expression, here, refers only to Bangladeshi (and, before, East Bengali and East Pakistani) migrants, not Bengali speakers from India or elsewhere—is traversed by multiple and continuous paths of geographic mobility: from Mediterranean Europe to the former colonial "motherland" and vice versa, within the countries of Mediterranean Europe, and in the unprecedented new route between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean.

The Pioneers of the Diaspora

In Bangladesh, migrants are called *londoni* or *probashi*. The former term derives from one of the first major destinations in the history of migration from Bangladesh—London and, by extension, the whole of the United Kingdom.⁴ The latter means "outside residents," "those who went outside," or "those who went to the *bidesh*" (the foreign land, abroad), in contrast with Bangladesh (meaning, "the land where Bangla is spoken"), which is the *shodesh* (the homeland, the motherland) or simply the *desh* (the country).⁵

Migratory movements from East Bengal (which became East Pakistan in 1947 and Bangladesh in 1971) to Europe originated as early as the 17th century, when a large number of people emigrated to England. In that century, the East India Company used imported cheap laborers—known as

laskars—to do the most menial jobs on its ships.⁶ These laborers were men who were mostly unmarried and who came from the eastern provinces of Bangladesh, from the maritime areas of Chittagong, Noakhali, and, above all, from the inland area of Sylhet.⁷

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the *laskars* began to leave these “floating factories” to find employment in Great Britain. Their destination was mainly the London Docklands and the adjacent district of Tower Hamlets, which are located in East London, but they also moved to the city’s old industrial centers.⁸

This first stage of Bangladeshi migration is generally identified in the literature as that of “the pioneers.” Although this period of migration lasted for a long time (up to the 1950s), it only involved a limited number of people. Exclusively men and generally unmarried, they were able to live and work in Great Britain without major bureaucratic problems or time constraints thanks to Bangladesh’s / East Pakistan’s Commonwealth membership.⁹

After World War II, they were encouraged to come by the British authorities, who were attempting to address the postwar labor shortage.¹⁰ These new migrants were “transnational” par excellence: they worked and lived in England but as often as possible returned home, where they were still involved in kinship networks and village social networks.¹¹

From the First Transnational Migrants to the Familiarization of Migration in Europe

A second phase began in 1962, when a series of restrictive policies was implemented in England to stabilize immigrant quotas: in line with the changes in European migration policies, first the labor voucher system and then the 1971 Immigration Act made migration increasingly difficult for those who were not already part of the migratory network.¹² In this system, immigrants could only enter the labor market with a work permit issued by the Home Office, and they needed intermediaries—that is, relatives and friends already living abroad, or *dalal*, a Bangla term for migration “brokers” who knew the bureaucratic procedures for entering the labor market and who could provide the correct information on how and where to stay once they arrived at their destination.¹³ Still in the 21st century, the migration experience of most Bangladeshi first-generation migrants to Europe begins through the mediation of a “migration broker.”¹⁴

Faced with increasing obstacles, those already on British soil opted for naturalization (obtaining British citizenship) and sedentarization, with their spouses and children who had remained at home joining them in the United Kingdom. Thus, from the 1970s to the early 1990s, the majority of “regular” entries were the wives and children of resident workers. The population of Bangladeshi origin has continued to be one of the youngest and fastest growing in the United Kingdom in the early 21st century as a result of these numerous family reunifications.¹⁵

From the 1980s, the transformation of Bangladeshi migratory movements to the United Kingdom—from short-term migration for work reasons to longer-term migration with the aim of settling there—was followed by the development of Bangladeshi entrepreneurial activity, especially in

the clothing, trade, and catering sectors. New ties with the desh were established through transnational marriages: marriage to a resident on British soil was one of the easiest ways to enter the capital of the former empire.¹⁶

Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s it was mainly wives who were reunited with their husbands in the country of immigration, in the early 21st century almost the same number of men have applied for residence permits in order to be reunited with their second-, third-, or fourth-generation wives, who married them following a transnational arranged marriage. This is already an established trend for countries with a longer history of immigration, and as of the early 21st century this trend has emerged in such immigration destinations as Italy.¹⁷

A Heterogeneous and Stratified Diaspora

From the 1970s onward, at the same time as the tightening of borders in the United Kingdom and western Europe—dictated by the need to lower the cost of labor power following the first oil shock—new migratory destinations opened up, including the countries of the so-called Middle East, whose economies, on the contrary, were quickly expanding and needed cheap labor power. Between the 1970s and the end of the 2000s, millions of workers emigrated from Bangladesh to Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, Libya, and some of the newly industrialized states of so-called Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore. These movements, in addition to affecting other Bangladeshi districts (no longer just Sylhet) such as Chittagong, Noakhali, Comilla, and Dhaka, were short-term and based on work contracts, which were bought in Bangladesh before departure, to perform specific jobs in the destination country. These were low-skilled jobs in sectors with low status and social recognition.¹⁸

Since the turn of the millennium, Bangladeshi emigration has been characterized by new migratory frontiers, including states in East Asia (South Korea and Japan), in western Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium), and in the Mediterranean area (Italy and Spain). At the same time, non-European English-speaking countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia are the main destinations for the more cosmopolitan and affluent Bangladeshi upper class.¹⁹

The cost of immigrating without regulation by official government channels, although still high for many Bangladeshi working families, is more affordable than regular immigration is. Each destination has its own rate proportionate to the possibilities it offers in terms of earning and remittances: while emigrating to France or Germany “costs” around 15,000 euros, Italy is one of the cheapest destinations in Western Europe, costing around 10,000 euros.²⁰

Although this shift in migration destinations is often explained as being a result of decreases in possible earnings and, thus, remittances, this explanation seems less convincing, considering the high unemployment rates in Southern Europe because of the economic and political crises in the Middle East. The new destinations of Bangladeshi migration are united with the old destinations by their thirst for immigrant labor, which is used in the informal economy and in sectors that

have been abandoned by the native labor force following the significant worsening of working conditions and wages—characteristics typical of the so-called Mediterranean model of immigration.²¹

The changes in migratory movements relate not only to the destination countries but also to the number of people migrating: whereas the pioneers were assimilated into rural low- to middle-income families, there have been more migrants coming from less privileged segments of the Bangladeshi population during the first decades of the 21st century.

The Bangladeshi Diaspora in Europe Is Redirected toward the Mediterranean

The 1990s saw a strong decrease in migration toward the United Kingdom, partly owing to changes in its migration policies and, also as a result of this, the establishment of new migration destinations, primarily in Eastern Europe and Mediterranean Europe.²² It is important to note that Bangladeshi immigration to continental Europe became established in the 1970s—first to the Federal Republic of Germany and, second, to Switzerland—following the CIA-backed coup d'état that led to the dictatorship of Ziaur Rahman, leading asylum seekers to flee the country.²³ In the second half of the 1970s, Federal Germany admitted over one thousand refugees from Bangladesh.²⁴ From the early 1980s, however, the German government imposed new restrictions on international protection, and migrants from Bangladesh found other destinations in Europe.²⁵ In the late 1970s, France also appeared as an attractive migration destination because of the election of a socialist president, François Mitterrand, who raised hopes of an imminent amnesty to regularize undocumented migrants. This encouraged hundreds of probashi who were already present in Europe, but were undocumented, to move to France.

Bangladeshi migration to France continued throughout the 1980s, but in 1989, with the arrival of Charles Pasqua at the Ministry of the Interior, French migration policies became more restrictive. This period also saw the first Western aggression against Iraq—the so-called first Gulf War—that made it impossible for Bangladeshis to migrate to the Middle East, and a regime change in the countries of “real socialism.” This mesh of historical and political events rerouted the Bangladeshi diaspora toward European countries in the Mediterranean area as well as to countries in Eastern Europe that were becoming more open to immigration.

Since the first two prosocialist governments of the Awami League, there had been close relations between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and these Eastern European countries.²⁶ This enabled the establishment of scholarships through which thousands of young Bangladeshis traveled to the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact countries to attend university.²⁷ In the years following the Soviet implosion, many of them stayed on in these countries, setting up entrepreneurial and commercial activities and creating large compatriot communities.²⁸ Despite an initial growth in the numbers of Bangladeshis in the area, the economic stagnation that characterized the beginning of the post-Soviet era and the growing racism that affected immigrants in the big cities ended up discouraging many of the probashi, who, hearing the persistent rumors about the potential for economic growth in Mediterranean Europe, left Russia

for Spain, Greece, and, above all, Italy.²⁹ These southern European countries had recently moved from a situation of net emigration to one of net immigration—and, even more recently, had begun to combine emigration and immigration flows. They still lacked organic policies on immigration and had economies that were in relative expansion and hungry for low-cost and highly flexible labor.³⁰

Thus, by the end of the 20th century, the situation of the Bangladeshi diaspora in Europe had profoundly changed: until the 1970s, Bangladeshi migrants mainly headed for the former colonial motherland, but by the late 1980s, the few thousand Bangladeshis in Europe outside of the United Kingdom were almost exclusively spread among Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, while between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, those Bangladeshis in Italy, Greece, and Spain had developed into some of the most important Bangladeshi diasporic communities in the world.³¹ In the 1990s, because of the expanding, though increasingly segmented, labor market in Mediterranean Europe, Bangladeshi migrants were offered higher wages and better social and working conditions than they were in Middle Eastern countries. In the same period, Mediterranean European countries also had less exclusionary migration policies often characterized by frequent amnesties (e.g., Italy's famous amnesty through the Martelli Law). This of course also added to their appeal as migration destinations.

Probashi in Spain, Greece, and Portugal

Spain became a country of immigration in 1985 and, in line with the Mediterranean model of immigration, had no organic immigration policy but needed an immigrant labor force. Amid administrative difficulties and political confusion, it launched a regularization program that included several amnesties—in 1991, 1996, 2000, and 2001—thus attracting a large number of undocumented Bangladeshis who were already present in Europe.

According to some studies, as of the first two decades of the 21st century seven thousand Bangladeshis live in Spain, while other studies suggest there are even more.³² Bangladeshis live in its main cities (Barcelona, Madrid, and Valencia) but also in tourist resorts such as Alicante and Malaga. Madrid is the city with the third-largest Bangladeshi community in Europe after Rome, with most concentrated in the district of Lavapiés.³³

Bangladeshis in Spain are hired to work in the low-skilled tertiary sector, in grocery shops and electronics stores, in restaurants advertised as “Indian,” or as street vendors selling drinks (*lateros*), much like in many other southern European cities such as Rome or Lisbon.³⁴ They thus conform to the model of the southern European labor market in which migrants carry out similar occupations generally linked to precarity and often to social exclusion.³⁵

Between the 1970s and the 1990s, Greece too was transformed from a country of emigration into a country of immigration. In 1998, when Greece launched its first regularization program, 3,024 Bangladeshi migrants applied for regularization.³⁶ In the 2001 population census, the number of Bangladeshi migrants in Greece had risen to 4,960 people, and by 2011 this figure had doubled to around 11,000. Despite the fact that Greece has a growing number of Bangladeshi migrants who

have been there for a long time, and despite the fact that a significant number of them live and work (and are exploited) in agriculture, the research on this migrant population focuses mainly on urban areas.³⁷

Fratsea and Papadopoulos have identified some of the characteristics of the Bangladeshi diaspora in Greece.³⁸ These include (a) rapidly increasing immigration. In 2015, arrivals from Bangladesh almost quadrupled compared to previous years, reaching 4,511 people. Another characteristic is that (b) despite the length of their residence in the country and regularization programs, a significant proportion of probashi in Greece remain irregular or semi-irregular in terms of their legal status. The number of Bangladeshi migrants holding a valid residence permit increased from 5,238 in 2008 to 9,207 in 2018, which is a small increase in comparison to the number of Bangladeshis in the country, with some studies estimating that half of Bangladeshis in Greece are undocumented. And (c) their distribution by age and gender suggests that they are young population of working age (42.6 percent are between twenty-five and thirty-four years old), almost exclusively male, and have an average level of education. Women and girls, who make up between 7 and 9 percent of the total, arrive through family reunification and are usually more highly educated than their husbands are. As far as marital status is concerned, 42.7 percent of Bangladeshis in Greece are married, although their families (spouses and children) usually remain in their country of origin. Over 70 percent of the Bangladeshi population in Greece are employed (45 percent in services, 25 percent in industry, and 19 percent in agriculture), but they are concentrated in low-status occupations with limited opportunities for upward social mobility. To sum up, Bangladeshi migration to Greece is a relatively recent phenomenon, and the Bangladeshi community there is rather diverse, both in terms of its socioeconomic characteristics and legal status. At least half of the Bangladeshi community in Greece live on the fringes of regularity, which reinforces their sense of general precarity. Precarity has thus evolved into a way of living that restricts their lives but also operates as leverage, mobilizing them against external constraints and limitations.³⁹

Portugal became a country of immigration in the mid-1960s and initially mainly received immigrants from its colonies and former colonies, although the records show that some Bangladeshi “pioneers” did arrive between 1986 and 1988. However, from the 1990s and especially from the beginning of the 2000s, immigrants would begin to become more diverse in terms of their nationality, again owing to the effect of the so-called extraordinary regularization programs that attracted undocumented immigrants already present in Europe who were looking for a regular residence permit. This included many Bangladeshis: 47 in 1994, 752 in 1995, 871 in 2001, up to over 2,000 Bangladeshis with documents in 2009 and, it seems, as many undocumented.⁴⁰

However, Melanie Knights recalls that some of her Bangladeshi interviewees who lived in Italy in the 1990s were leaving the country to try their luck in the United States and Canada—aiming to realize their dream of joining the elite—while others applied for asylum in Germany and Switzerland, and a few had already left to Portugal.⁴¹ This brings to light both a global Banglascap— the movement of the Bangladeshi diaspora from Europe to the world—and a European Banglascap that is constantly on the move—from northern to southern Europe but also in the opposite direction.⁴²

A Bidesh Called Italy: An *Adam Bepari* Called Rome

It is Italy, however, that is particularly important to Bangladeshi mobility in Europe and that thus deserves special attention. It became a country of immigration in the mid-1970s, its informal economy creates at least 20 percent of its GDP, and the labor market needs flexible and cheap labor. Its first regulations related to migration tried to respond to the needs of the country, taking a *laissez-faire* approach in terms of how the regulations were instrumentalized, being relatively lenient toward irregular immigrants and, increasingly frequently—almost every four years—, implementing amnesties.⁴³ These attempts to recruit a low-cost labor force and to regularize huge sections of the migrant population attracted large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants to Italy from all over Europe.⁴⁴ It thus shifted from being a transit country to being a sought-after destination for Bangladeshi migration, with many Bangladeshi immigrants arriving from previous migration experiences in continental or Eastern Europe or from Arab countries.⁴⁵

Before the 1990s, the number of Bangladeshi migrants in Italy remained negligible, and they were mainly concentrated in Rome; often, they were migrants in transit (with the hope of moving to other European countries or overseas, to Canada or the United States). Given that migration was expensive, it was initially reserved for a middle-class—and, sometimes, upper-middle-class—youth who owned land or industry in Bangladesh, which they often mortgaged or sold to be able to afford to migrate. In the 1990s, Italy became an important destination for Bangladeshis: following the 1986 amnesty (Law 943/86, the Martelli Law; see “Bangladeshi Diaspora in Europe Is Redirected toward the Mediterranean”), only around one hundred Bangladeshi citizens were granted a residence permit; following the 1990 amnesty (Law 39/90), that number reached almost four thousand; in the early 2000s, more than seventy thousand Bangladeshis received a permit.⁴⁶ The Bangladeshi community in Italy in the early 21st century stands at 139,000 people, making it the sixth-biggest non-European community in the country.⁴⁷

The territorial distribution of Bangladeshis was far from homogeneous: until the end of the 1990s, they were concentrated almost exclusively in Rome, where according to the 1991 census, 92 percent of them lived, working mainly as street hawkers.⁴⁸ In that period, the number of Bangladeshis settling in the capital increased so quickly that it made the Bangladeshi community living in the capital one of the largest in Europe, second only to that of London. Rome acted as a step on the journey, a place where Bangladeshis—if not friends and acquaintances, then at least compatriots—could meet to be informed about the latest opportunities to work or to stay in Italy or in other European states. Rome is still one of the so-called *Adam Bepari* (it is a Bangla term widely used by Bangladeshi migrants and local media to describe those people who are familiar with migration procedures and cash in on this familiarity, access or connection for economic advantage)—that is, it acts as an initial hub for the organization and diffusion of the Bangladeshi diaspora across the world.⁴⁹ In fact, this expression refers to a subject or an hub that offers services and intermediaries who can facilitate migration and settlement in a context of destination.

However, the main reasons for being there were the opportunities it offered to work in the informal economy (services, catering, tourism, small businesses, etc.) and the possibility of disappearing within the dense mesh of the city's Bangladeshi community, which was particularly useful for those who did not yet have a residence permit.

The Bangladeshi community that became established in Italy in the 1990s had its own structure, in terms of economics and employment: the this structure has been the result of the conditions imposed by Italy in the 1990s. The Bangladeshis in Italy at that time could be divided into three main groups: entrepreneurs, subordinate workers, and street vendors. By the end of 1991, the entrepreneurs—who were a minority in terms of numbers and were mainly made up of political leaders and associations—opened shops and establishments aimed at meeting the demands of the community. Import-export activities (to supply compatriots who lived off the retail trade), phone centers, and food, clothing, jewelry, or DVD retailers not only acted as meeting places but were also indispensable for obtaining information on Italian bureaucratic procedures, services, and job or housing opportunities. The group of subordinate workers was also crucial not only because of their large numbers but also because they acted as a protective umbrella for those without work and without residence permits. Many Bangladeshis also earned money by providing so-called migration services—that is, by helping their compatriots find accommodation, work, food, and low-cost access to telephone calls or to internet connections with friends and relatives or by becoming intermediaries in the hundi or hawala system, which was a way to send remittances transnationally through circuits that were alternatives to those offered by the banks.⁵⁰

Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, in which only the middle upper classes who were eager to raise their social status migrated, by the early 21st century, migration had become much more extensive and also concerned Bangladesh's small middle class and even its lower middle class, which is formed of small traders and farmers. Although those positioned at the bottom of the social scale (in terms of availability of resources) are precluded from migrating, it has become a much more widely held aspiration. Zeitlyn identifies migrants in Italy who belong not so much to the traditional middle class as to a class made up of subjects with an average level of income from migration and the remittances earned from it.⁵¹ Instead of being landowners with capital to invest in migration, with educated children, and with a willingness to take risks, many Bangladeshi migrants who have come to Italy in the 21st century appear to have originally been of low socioeconomic status, as they often have rural origins and low levels of education.⁵² Their migratory experiences in the Middle East, where they often worked in construction or as industrial workers, has allowed them to make the same investments and to take the same risks as the urban middle class.

The 1990s were also characterized by a *fragmentation* of the Bangladeshi community and the *dispersion* of many Bangladeshis across Italy. Those without documents tended to stay longer in the capital, as they depended on the support of the Bangladeshi community. Conversely, those who finally received regular residence permits left the capital in order to achieve better social, working, and living conditions, thereby carrying out a migration within migration within the country.⁵³ Thus, various “Bangla-towns” sprang up in various provincial areas, offering opportunities to settle close to major industrial centers in northern regions with good

employment opportunities, especially in the northeast of the country—which appeared to be a particularly prosperous area at the time—where they found jobs in factories and warehouses.⁵⁴ So while the capital still attracts a large number of Bangladeshis, many of them are moving to other Italian cities, creating their own ethnic enclaves.⁵⁵

The Bangladeshi migrants employed in low-skilled tasks in the industrial or service sector in Italy were not part of the working class in their country of origin and “would never dream of doing in their home country” the work they do in Italy.⁵⁶

Furthermore, just like in Spain, Greece, and Portugal, in the early 1990s, the Bangladeshi community in Italy was still composed almost exclusively of men.⁵⁷ But whereas women were almost nonexistent in earlier Bangladeshi migration, their numbers have increased slightly with the passage of time through the community stabilization process; indeed, their presence in Italy is almost exclusively linked to family reunification, in which women who initially remained in Bangladesh have now joined their husbands in Italy. Because of the huge number of family reunifications, Bangladeshi migration to Italy went through a process of consolidation, stabilization, and familiarization, followed by the birth of the so-called second generations.

. . . and One Day They All Moved to London

The first generation of Bangladeshis who arrived in Mediterranean Europe between the 1990s and 2000s has now become firmly established, with more secure material, social, and family situations. However, over the years, on the one hand, the economic and social face of the country has changed, and, on the other hand, Bangladeshi migrants' legal status has evolved along with their duties and aspirations. The global economic crisis has hit the countries of Mediterranean Europe particularly hard, damaging the possibilities of upward social mobility for working-class families and their children, especially those with a migration background.⁵⁸ At the same time, Bangladeshi immigrants now have to take responsibility for their children who have been born in Europe and, after more than fifteen to twenty years of living in Italy, have often become European citizens. If, for some, the acquisition of Italian, Spanish, Greek, or Portuguese citizenship represents the last step in a process of settling in Europe, for others, on the contrary, it is the key to accessing migratory mobility on a European level and beyond. For with an EU passport, these probashi can now migrate within the European space without requiring entry visas.

From about 2010 onward, this translated into an onward migration process that has been oriented in almost all cases toward the United Kingdom and, especially, to London. The expression *onward migration* designates, for example, the migratory reactivation of migrants from third countries who, once they have acquired citizenship in an EU country in southern Europe, move toward central and northern European countries.⁵⁹

A combination of individual factors, collective histories, and more or less idealized representations of the British context explain this specific onward migration toward the United Kingdom.⁶⁰

It is possible to identify a common motive for this new migration: the aspiration of Bangladeshi migrants for upward social mobility for their children and for their desire to invest in the future of new generations. In many Italian Bangladeshis' perceptions and representations, to stay in southern Europe would be to risk their children following their professional and existential trajectory as generic workers who are locked into subordinate sectors of the labor market. Parents believe that if their children do not learn good English, it will threaten their future prospects outside of Italy, particularly if they want to return to Bangladesh.

Therefore, London is considered to be more beneficial for their children's future than Mediterranean Europe is. For instance, many parents want to offer their children socialization and education in the English language, as they believe it is essential if they want to enter the international labor market and would give them the opportunity for future geographical mobility across national borders. Education in the English language is also identified as a status symbol that only upper-class people in Bangladesh can afford.

London is represented—not without a certain amount of idealization—as the global and multicultural city par excellence and as providing opportunities and a meritocracy that allows young people of all national origins to enhance their skills and potential. This representation of the British capital is linked, on the one hand, to the historic role of London as the capital of the British Empire and, therefore, of institutions and values nostalgically considered to still be in force and, on the other, to the presumed dominance of multiculturalism, which—precisely by virtue of the country's colonial past and its long tradition of immigration from former colonies—is seen as contributing to the construction of a society in which no one is stigmatized or discriminated against because of their “ethno-racial” belonging, national origin, religious faith, or other linguistic and cultural factors.

The issue of the lack of meritocracy had already emerged in the representations of the limits of Mediterranean European societies, especially in relation to the labor market. This narrative is reinforced by a shared idea of London as a place in which social fulfillment is based on individuals' abilities and qualifications, regardless of their ascribed social membership. The long migratory tradition that has linked the Indian subcontinent to the former colonial homeland since the 17th century and that allowed for the creation of the oldest and largest Bangladeshi community outside of Bangladesh has meant that London is now perceived as a small Bangladesh in Europe. That is, the British capital is seen as a context in which it is possible to feel at home and to live in accordance with what many Italian probashi define as “the Bengali culture and lifestyle.”

The possibility of being able to express their religious affiliation with greater freedom in the public domain, to enter into a wider community of Muslims, and, above all, to guarantee a religious education for their children also acts as a fundamental drive toward this new migration.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom is also perceived as a more attractive destination than Italy is because of its welfare system, which is considered to be more inclusive than the Mediterranean one.

For these probashi, being European on paper is not a sufficient condition to protect them from the societal discrimination and inequalities that many of them experience every day, especially in the labor market in southern Europe, in countries that have only relatively recently stopped being countries of emigration and that have become countries of immigration. They perceive and describe these societies as still being unprepared to include citizens of different ethnic-cultural backgrounds or with different national origins, and they implicitly express their aspiration to live in a more cosmopolitan social context and, above all, in a more inclusive labor market.

However, of the European probashi who have relocated to London, some have realized their dreams and others have been disappointed by the unexpected negative aspects of their new migration.⁶¹ Many have also decided to retrace their steps, returning to southern Europe, and others, above all after the United Kingdom left the European Union, have begun to plan for or have already engaged in intra-European mobility.⁶² However, most, have (perhaps permanently) settled in the British capital, and many have sworn allegiance to the monarchy to acquire British citizenship.

The New Mobility of Bangladeshi Unintended Asylum Seekers

The analysis of mobilities across European Banglascapes brings to light a relatively new phenomenon, that of the growing number of Bangladeshi refugees and applicants for humanitarian protection arriving on Italian shores: according to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, almost nine thousand Bangladeshis arrived in the first seven months of 2017, constituting the second-largest national group on the central Mediterranean route, after Nigerians.⁶³

This is a sort of secondary migration by Bangladeshi immigrants who were previously in the Middle East and, in this specific case, in Libya, as “temporary guest workers.”⁶⁴ Using international recruitment agencies, which are the result of agreements between Bangladesh and private companies in the recruiting countries, they found employment in the Middle East, signing contracts lasting between three and ten years. These recruitment agencies and dalal ask the migrants—who either take out a debt or sell their family’s property—for between 3,000 and 5,000 euros in exchange for providing them with an entry visa and work contract. Once they have arrived, these Gastarbeiter often work in clandestine conditions of complete exclusion. They are usually from rural areas with little economic and cultural capital to start with, and through labor migration to an oil-producing country try to accumulate sufficient resources to repay their debt and to realize other goals such as buying a house, starting a small businesses in their country of origin, or investing the proceeds in a second (or third or fourth) migration to a more desirable destination.

Bangladeshi refugees to Italy mainly come from Libya, from which they fled as a result of military aggression and the resulting conflict that is devastating the country. The modalities of this secondary migration are similar to those of many other migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa, fleeing on foot or with whatever means they have at their disposal, often through the desert, and crossing the Mediterranean on unsafe boats.

Before the military aggression and international crisis, Libya was a destination of choice for Bangladeshis. According to some estimates, as of the early 21st century, it hosts over twenty thousand Bangladeshi workers. In fact, even during the armed conflict and the ongoing crisis in Libya (but also in Syria and Iraq), recruitment agencies continued to meet the needs of local companies by recruiting labor from the Indian subcontinent, including from Bangladesh. As a result, large numbers of Bangladeshi workers, who were aware of the risks and dangers in Libya, nevertheless migrated there. However, the escalation and widening of the conflict drove them to seek refuge across the Mediterranean, undertaking a new, previously unplanned migration.⁶⁵

This second movement could also have been fueled by other factors. The power vacuum that was created after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi has created a general situation of insecurity, within which criminal organizations controlling portions of the territory—which are often used by the Italian government, both before and during the early 21st century, to control immigration to the northern shores of the Mediterranean—kidnap and torture Bangladeshi migrants in exchange for a ransom to be paid with the help of their families in Bangladesh. This then leads to further indebtedness for the probashi and their families on top of the debt incurred to finance the migration. Furthermore, since the Libyan banking system does not, as of the early 21st century, function efficiently, those who are not kidnapped and tortured risk being robbed of the remittances that they wanted to send home, which are often accumulated over months or years of working in the country.

As a result of these experiences, many Bangladeshi workers have no choice but to embark on a new migration toward Europe. This is for a number of reasons: after having gone into debt in Bangladesh in order to get to Libya, to return home in even more debt is socially, materially, and emotionally impossible. A plane ticket to Bangladesh, which can cost up to a year's work in Libya, is more expensive than risking one's life to cross the Mediterranean, and many lose their passports and other documents as a result of kidnapping or robbery.

According to information gathered by the NGO Médecins sans Frontières, most Bangladeshis fleeing Libya are between sixteen and thirty-five years old and have lived in Libya for some time. Moreover, consistent with the social stratification of the diaspora, whereas the first and second waves of Bangladeshis who arrived in Italy between the 1990s and the 2000s were made up of educated and urban young people belonging to the middle (and upper-middle) classes in Bangladesh, who had high standards and aspirations and were uninterested in less prestigious and remunerative destinations like the Middle East and Libya, the very young probashi fleeing from Libya to reach Italian shores come from Bangladesh's rural laboring class. Thus, what is seen in the countries of destination as a homogeneous "Bangladeshi community" is made up of various groups with different expectations, projects, and priorities, coming from diverse family backgrounds with different levels of cultural capital and social status.

Similarly, many Syrian or Iraqi applicants for international protection are middle- and upper-class professionals who are fleeing their country because of the destruction caused by armed conflict, and thus for them Italy is a much less attractive destination than Germany or

Scandinavia are, whereas for Bangladeshi wage laborers at the lowest levels of the social scale, Mediterranean European countries give them a better chance of realizing their migratory project than the Libyan context had offered them.

As entry into Italy for economic reasons is not permitted, as of the early 21st century, the probashi have to enter through the international protection channel. Thus, as Del Franco points out,

Bangladeshi migrants do what they can to discard the label of “undeserving economic migrant” embracing instead that of “refugee” by creating a proper migration narrative. By repeatedly applying for asylum status, they earn time to pursue their objectives: earn an income and support their households back home, and ultimately a future status that grants them leave to remain in Italy.⁶⁶

Conclusions

Bangladeshi migration to Europe has several different components, often corresponding to the different social and class backgrounds of the migrants involved, which are rooted in the country’s long tradition of migration and also shaped by the changing international political and economic scenario.

To begin with, laskars emigrated for work reasons; they left on ships bound for the ports of London, which led to the formation of the first probashi communities and the stabilization of migrants who found employment in British industries. London hosted what would become the largest Bangladeshi diasporic community in Europe. However, in the 1970s, both the British context and the countries of continental Europe that were traditionally destinations for international migration (Federal Germany, France, Switzerland), started to tighten up entry requirements so as to devalue the whole workforce, as a reaction to the economic crisis caused by the first oil shock.

At the same time, countries in Mediterranean Europe underwent profound transformations in their social, economic, and productive spheres and within a few decades established themselves as new destinations for international migration. Migration to Mediterranean Europe is a relatively recent but exponentially increasing part of Bangladeshi migration, and it is mainly made up of Bangladeshi middle-class men but increasingly also of young men from working-class backgrounds. Thus, during the 1990s, Italy and Spain, but also Greece and Portugal, became the main destinations of Bangladeshis to Europe (as a result of the convergence between the economic-productive needs of these countries, the availability of work for the migrants, and the possibilities of regularization offered by those countries’ first immigration laws). As a result of its increasing importance, the Bangladeshi community on the northern shores of the Mediterranean has undergone profound transformations both quantitatively—as a result of the exponential growth in arrivals—and qualitatively—having a more diverse social stratification as well as a growing tendency toward familiarization.

In the early 21st century, on the one hand, the socioeconomic landscape has changed, particularly after the global economic crisis, which hit southern Europe particularly hard, wiping out the chances of upward social mobility for young working-class people, especially those of immigrant origin. On the other hand, the expectations and family and legal statuses of probashi in Mediterranean Europe have changed. This is due to the birth of the so-called second generations and the desire of their parents—who, in the meantime, have acquired Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, or Greek citizenship and, therefore, a European passport—to invest in their children's future in a social, territorial, and cultural context that they believe can offer them better opportunities. Thus, a new migration has taken shape, definable as an “onward migration” directed from the countries of Mediterranean Europe toward the former colonial motherland and, above all, to London, the migratory dream of generations of middle-class Bangladeshis.⁶⁷ However, the migratory mobility of these probashi, who are now European citizens, has not come to an end: while some have (perhaps permanently) settled in the British capital, even acquiring British citizenship, many others, because of some unexpected disillusionments to their new migration and, above all, to the implementation of Brexit, have decided to retrace their steps partially, returning to the northern shores of the Mediterranean, or they have made the decision to move on to other European countries.

Meanwhile, many unskilled Bangladeshi workers who had previously migrated to Libya, one of the main Middle Eastern destinations of the Bangladeshi diaspora, also find themselves in an onward migration: they leave their previous migratory destination, cross the Mediterranean, and arrive on Italian shores as asylum seekers, joining the probashi communities already present in Italy, but they come from profoundly different social worlds—whereas the unskilled Bangladeshi workers from Libya come from a humble rural class background and have low levels of education, the already-settled probashi are from the educated urban middle classes—and, consequently, have incomparable lives, aspirations, and family backgrounds.

These are the different pieces making up the kaleidoscopic prism of multiple mobilities across European Banglascapes.

Primary Sources

The story of Bangladeshi migration to the United Kingdom has already been clearly outlined by Caroline Adams and Katy Gardner, with particular reference to the main diasporic community in inner East London.⁶⁸ It has been studied in relation to its family and gender dynamics as well as to its generational, political, religious, and cultural dynamics.⁶⁹ A good source of information on the Bangladeshi diaspora in the United Kingdom is the website of the Bangla Stories project.⁷⁰ Bangladeshi migration to the United Kingdom represents an intersection of the broader Bengali diaspora, which has been historically traced and sociologically explored by Claire Alexander, Joya Chatterji, and Annu Jalais, and Nazli Kibria.⁷¹

Among the various studies on Bangladeshi migration around the world, the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit in Dhaka, which takes the perspective of the country of origin, has published a series of studies on the mobility of the probashi to and within Europe, specifically focusing on students in the United Kingdom and on Bangladeshi communities in Italy and Spain.⁷²

Since Bangladeshi migration to Mediterranean Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon, especially when compared to migration to that of London, there are far fewer bibliographic sources.

The works of Melanie Knights and Russell King and, later, those of Andrea Priori on immigration from Bangladesh to Rome are important.⁷³ Whereas King and Knights' geographical work can be considered as pioneering as they are topical, Priori's transnational perspective provides an indispensable bibliography of what had been written up to 2012 on the Bangladeshi diaspora in Europe. Priori also played a crucial role in the volume edited by Francesco Pompeo that gives an anthropological-urbanist analysis of the neighborhood in which Rome's probashi community is concentrated.⁷⁴

The research by Patrizia Quattrocchi, Micol Toffoletti, and Elena Vera Tommasini focuses on the Bangladeshi community in Monfalcone, in the province of Gorizia, who were attracted by the ease of finding jobs in the shipbuilding industry, analyses the migratory dynamics of a community that had hitherto been almost completely ignored both in Italy and Southern Europe.⁷⁵

A further point of reference on Bangladeshi immigration to Italy and on intra-European Bangladeshi migration is Francesco Della Puppa's book that specifically focuses on the family and gender dimension, analyzing the transformations in the masculinity of male immigrants who have been reunited with their families in northeastern Italy and, then, on the onward migration that took them to the United Kingdom and, in particular, to London.⁷⁶ Della Puppa is also the author of various texts on the intra-European and cross-European mobility of Bangladeshis who have acquired Italian citizenship as well as on their eventual return to Italy.⁷⁷ See Francesco Goglia and Becky Winstanley on the (bi)linguistic aspects of this migration, and see Dal Franco on onward migration to Italy.⁷⁸ Finally, on Bangladeshi associationism in Italy, see Morad and Della Puppa and Mantovan.⁷⁹ For an innovative experiment on Bangladeshi immigration to Italy and on the intra-European mobility of probashi, see the graphic novel by Francesco Della Puppa, Francesco Matteuzzi, and Francesco Saresin.⁸⁰

It should be emphasized that scholarship on Bangladeshis in Italy became more extensive than for other southern European societies, also owing to the more intense presence, both in quantitative and qualitative terms—as well as the longer migratory history—of Bangladeshis in Italy compared to the other countries of the southern Europe.

José Mapril is an indispensable reference on probashi communities in Portugal, focusing on Lisbon and the intra-European onward migration of Luso-Bangladeshi people.⁸¹ On the Spanish case, see Zeitlyn (see "Bidesh Called Italy") and, on Madrid, see Óscar Salguero Montaña and Hutan Hejazi and Méndez.⁸² In relation to the Greek context, see Charalambos Kasimis, Apostolos Papadopoulos, and Stavros Zografakis on the social precariousness of probashi in rural areas.⁸³ See Fratsea and Papadopoulos on the (im)mobility of probashi.⁸⁴ And see Reena Kukreja on the working conditions of Bangladeshi agricultural laborers.⁸⁵

For a more general perspective on probashi mobilities across Europe, the special issue of the journal *Migration Letters*, edited by Francesco Della Puppa, José Mapril, and Andrea Priori titled *Banglascapes in Southern Europe: Im-Mobilities, Emplacements, Temporalities* is essential reading, particularly its introductory essay.⁸⁶

Further Reading

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Notes

1. Ranabir Samaddar, *The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal* (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Dhaka University Press, 1999).
2. Rafiuddin Ahmed, *Understanding the Bengal Muslims: Interpretative Essays* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3. Willelm Van Schendel, *A History of Bangladesh* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
4. Bangladeshi villages with a high percentage of emigrants and thus good transnational relations with Europe are defined in the same way.
5. K. Gardner, *Global Migrants, Local Lives: Migration and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Katy Gardner, *Age, Narrative and Migration: Life History and Life Course amongst Bengali Elders* (London and Oxford: Berg, 2002); and N. Kibria, *Muslims in Motion: Islam and National Identity in the Bangladeshi Diaspora* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2011).
6. This term was generically used in the colonial era to designate the sailors from the colonies of the British empire (mainly from the subcontinent) recruited to work on Western ships.
7. Claire Adams, *Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers: Life Stories of Pioneer Sylheti Settlers in Britain* (London: Thap, 1987); F. Della Puppa, "Italian-Bangladeshi in London: A Community within a Community?," *Migration Letters* 18, no. 1 (2021): 35–47; Gardner, *Global Migrants, Local Lives*; Gardner, *Age, Narrative and Migration*; Kibria, *Muslims in Motion*; and B. Zeitlyn, *Transnational Childhood: British Bangladeshis, Identities and Social Change* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
8. On East London, see Adams, *Across Seven Seas*; Della Puppa, "Italian-Bangladeshi in London," 35–47; John Eade, *The Politics of Community: The Bangladeshi Community in East London* (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1989); John Eade, "Nationalism and the Quest for Authenticity: The Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets," *New Community* 16, no. 4 (1990): 493–503; John Eade, "Identity, Nation and Religion: Educated Young Bangladeshi Muslims in London's East End,"

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9. The 1948 British National Act gave British citizenship to all residents in India and Pakistan as members of the former British empire. Two decades later, in 1962, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act imposed severe restrictions on the arrivals of migrants coming from the subcontinent, transforming those who were already in the United Kingdom into “permanent settlers.” See Adams, *Across Seven Seas*; H. Ansari, *The Fidelity Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800* (London: Hurst, 2004); Angela Dale, *Migration, Marriage and Employment among Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Residents in the UK: CSSR Working Paper* (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester, 2008); Kibria, *Muslims in Motion*; and Ceri Peach, *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census: The Ethnic Minority Populations of Britain* (London: HmsO, 1996).

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11. John Eade, Clive Vamlew, and Ceri Peach, “The Bangladeshi: The Encapsulated Community,” in *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Vol 11, The Ethnic Minority Populations of Great Britain*, ed. C. Peach (London: HMSO); Eade, Fremeaux, and Garbin, “Political Construction of Diasporic”; Gardner, *Global Migrants, Local Lives*; and Gardner, *Age, Narrative and Migration*.

12. Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration* (New York: Macmillan, 2003).

13. In the phase in which work vouchers were used, which ended in the late 1960s, Bangladeshis were employed in industry and lived in the United Kingdom for brief periods (for a few months or years), with the aim of returning as soon as possible to Bangladesh with sufficient capital to buy a house or agricultural land or to set up a business. Chowdhury Abrar and Janet Seeley, eds., *Social Protection and Livelihoods: Marginalised Migrant Workers of India and Bangladesh* (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press, 2009); Tasneem Siddiqui and Chowdhury. Abrar, *Making Dalals Visible: Towards Transparency in Recruitment* (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Rmmru, 2019); and B. Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh to Italy and Spain* (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Rmmru, 2006).

14. The dalal is usually an immigrant who has been living in the destination country for some time or a returning emigrant. As part of the chain linking the destination country with the country of origin, they have access to information, institutional contacts, and informal knowledge needed for those wanting to migrate and can either be self-employed intermediaries or work for government agencies, or nongovernmental subagencies involved in labor-force recruitment (used by about 60 percent of migrants headed for the Persian Gulf), or they can work for organizations that operate outside of the official circuits. The mediation of a dalal can aid in the recruitment of new workers. The dalal may belong to the migrant's extended family circle; sometimes and often he is employed by the company who is recruiting workers. For this service, the dalal asks for financial compensation from the prospective migrant that roughly corresponds to the latter's annual salary once they arrive. On the one hand, this could be read as taking advantage of the vulnerable condition of the new arrivals; on the other hand, for many potential migrants it is the only possibility they have for emigration: it allows them to defer the payment of the debt owed for the journey over a few years, through the monthly withdrawal of a small portion of their salary in the destination country, as they do not have to pay anything on their departure from the country of origin.

15. The 2001 census estimated a total population of 283,603 residents, of whom 38 percent were under sixteen years old.
16. Dale, *Migration, Marriage and Employment*; and Kibria, *Muslims in Motion*.
17. Claire Alexander, "Marriage, Migration, Multiculturalism: Gendering 'the Bengal Diaspora,'" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39, no. 3 (2013): 333–351; C. Alexander, J. Chatterji, and A. Jalais, *The Bengal Diaspora: Rethinking Muslim Migration* (Abingdon, VA, and New York: Routledge, 2016); and F. Della Puppa, *Uomini in movimento: Il lavoro della maschilità tra Bangladesh e Italia* (Turin, Italy: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2014).
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23. Van Schendel, *History of Bangladesh*.
24. Priori, *Romer Probashira*.
25. M. Knights and R. King, "The Geography of Bangladeshi Migration to Rome," *International Journal of Population Geography* 4 (1998): 299–321.
26. Van Schendel, *History of Bangladesh*.
27. Francesco Della Puppa, "A Redeemed Biography? Migration as an Intra-Family Redemption Device," *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia* 1(LX): 127–154; and Knights and King, "Geography of Bangladeshi," 299–321.
28. Della Puppa, "Redeemed Biography?"; Knights and King, "Geography of Bangladeshi.", and Priori, *Romer Probashira*.
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31. Priori, *Romer Probashira*.
32. Tasneem Siddiqui, *Institutionalising Diaspora Linkage: The Emigrant Bangladeshis in UK and USA* (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Rmmru, 2004); and Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*.

33. J. R. Méndez, “Políticas de lo colectivo en entornos de migración transnacional: Posibilidades de lo bangladesí en Lavapiés (Madrid),” *Disparidades: Revista de Antropología* 74, no. 2 (2019), e021; Ó. Salguero Montaña and H. Hejazi, “Multiculturalism, Gentrification, and Islam in the Public Space: The Case of Baitul Mukarram in Lavapiés,” *Migration Letters* 18, no. 1 (2021): 85–96; and Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*.
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42. Priori, Mapril, and Della Puppa, “Banglascapes in Southern Europe.”
43. Della Puppa, *Uomini in movimento*.
44. Della Puppa, *Uomini in movimento*; and Priori, *Romer Probashira*.
45. Della Puppa, *Uomini in movimento*; and Priori, *Romer Probashira*.
46. Francesco Della Puppa and Enrico Gelati, *Alte Ceccato: Una banglatown nel nordest* (Trento, Italy: Professional Dreamers, 2015); Knights, “Political, Economic and Social Structure”; M. Knights, “Migrants as Networkers: The Economics of Bangladeshi Migration to Rome,” in *Southern Europe and the New Immigrations*, ed. Russell King (Brighton, United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press, 1997); M. Knights, “Bangladeshi Immigrants in Italy: From Geopolitics to Micropolitics,” *Transaction of the Institute of British Geographers* 21 (1998): 105–123; Knights and King, “Geography of Bangladeshi”; Priori, *Romer Probashira*; and Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*.
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48. Knights, “Political, Economic and Social Structure”; Knights, “Migrants as Networkers”; Knights, “Bangladeshi Immigrants in Italy”; and Knights and King, “Geography of Bangladeshi.”
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50. Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*.
51. Gardner, *Global Migrants, Local Lives*; and Priori, *Romer Probashira*.
52. Knights, *Bangladeshi in Rome*; Knights, “Bangladeshi Immigrants in Italy”; Priori, *Romer Probashira*; and Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*.
53. Knights, *Bangladeshi in Rome*; and Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*; and Pugliese, “Mediterranean Model of Immigration.”
54. Della Puppa and Gelati, *Alte Ceccato*.
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56. Zeitlyn, *Migration from Bangladesh*, 32.
57. Alessia Montuori, “La comunità del Bangladesh in Italia,” *Affari sociali internazionali* 3 (1997): 53–65.
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