By taking Wittgenstein's well-known reflections on following a rule as its starting point, the paper suggests that what the Austrian philosopher meant by rule could better be understood in terms of habits, as these have been theorized by the classical pragmatists – and by John Dewey in particular. This kind of interpretation reinforces both the rejection of the intellectualistic approach to the issue of following rules, and the emphasis on their primarily social dimension. On the other hand, this reading also forces us to clarify what the anthropological consequences might be of Wittgenstein's leap from the dichotomy between the alleged a priori norms and their alleged empirical actualizations to our already meaningful ordinary practices. Consequently, the paper articulates the basic anthropological assumptions characterizing the pragmatist approach to habits by stressing their natural and social implications. Finally, the author outlines what the consequences might be of this interpretation of rules in terms of habits for the question of normativity.
|Titolo:||Understanding rules as habits. Developing a pragmatist anthropological approach|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Articolo su rivista |
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|paradigmisaggio.pdf||versione pubblicata del saggio||Documento in Post-print||Accesso chiuso-personale||Open Access dal 06/02/2022|