NOTHING REALLY MATTERS TO ME. A Critique of Emanuele Severino's Resolution of the Aporia of Nothingness

This paper analyzes and criticizes Emanuele Severino’s resolution of the aporia of nothingness. Severino’s solution consists in two theses: A) the meaning of ‘nothingness’ is self‐contradictory; B) the determinate content of the meaning of nothingness is consistent (it does not imply by itself any contradiction). After distinguishing three possible interpretations of the term ‘nothing’ (as a quantifier, as a noun‐phrase, and as a concept), the paper argues that there is no interpretation that makes both theses A) and B) simultaneously true. This shows that Severino’s formulation and resolution of the problem of nothingness is untenable; moreover, it is shown that his resolution is based on an ambiguity between the nounphrase and the concept interpretation.